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Abstract
In a standard incomplete markets model with a continuum of households that have con-
stant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, the absence of insurance markets for idiosyn-
cratic labor income risk has no eﬀect on the premium for aggregate risk if the distribution
of idiosyncratic risk is independent of aggregate shocks and aggregate consumption growth
is independent over time. In the equilibrium, which features trade and binding solvency
constraints, as opposed to Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996), households only use the stock
market to smooth consumption; the bond market is inoperative. Furthermore we show that
the cross-sectional wealth and consumption distributions are not aﬀected by aggregate shocks.
These results hold regardless of the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks, and arise even when
households face tight solvency constraints, but only a weaker irrelevance result survives when
we allow for predictability in aggregate consumption growth.
1 Introduction
This paper provides general conditions under which closing down insurance markets for idiosyn-
cratic risk (our deﬁnition of market incompleteness) does not increase the risk premium that stocks
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1command over bonds. We study a standard incomplete markets endowment economy populated
by a continuum of agents who have CRRA preferences and who can trade a risk-free bond and a
stock, subject to potentially binding solvency constraints. In the benchmark version of our model
the growth rate of the aggregate endowment is uncorrelated over time, that is, the logarithm of
aggregate income is a random walk. Under these assumptions, the presence of uninsurable idiosyn-
cratic risk is shown to lower the equilibrium risk-free rate, but it has no eﬀect on the price of
aggregate risk in equilibrium if the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is statistically independent
of aggregate shocks. Consequently, in this class of models, the representative agent Consumption-
CAPM (CCAPM) developed by Rubinstein (1974) , Breeden (1979) and Lucas (1978) prices the
excess returns on the stock correctly. Therefore, as long as idiosyncratic shocks are distributed
independently of aggregate shocks, the extent to which households manage to insure against id-
iosyncratic income risk as well as the tightness of the borrowing constraints they face are irrelevant
for risk premia. These results deepen the equity premium puzzle, because we show that Mehra
and Prescott’s (1985) statement of the puzzle applies to a much larger class of incomplete market
models.1 We also show that uninsurable income risk does not contribute to any variation in the
conditional market price of risk.
While earlier work exploring autarchic equilibria by Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) is sugges-
tive of the irrelevance of idiosyncratic (consumption) risk, our work derives the exact conditions for
irrelevance in non-autarchic equilibria for economies with standard labor income processes while
allowing for binding borrowing constraints. We show that these conditions depend critically on the
properties of aggregate consumption growth once trade of ﬁnancial assets occurs in equilibrium.
The asset pricing implications of our model follow from a crucial result about equilibrium
consumption and portfolio allocations. We show that in this class of incomplete market models
with idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, the equilibrium allocations and prices can be obtained from
the allocations and interest rates of an equilibrium in a stationary model with only idiosyncratic risk
(as in Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994)). Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that scaling
up the consumption allocation of the Bewley equilibrium by the aggregate endowment delivers an
equilibrium for the model with aggregate risk. In this equilibrium, there is no trade in bond
markets, only in stock markets. This result is the key to why the history of aggregate shocks has
no bearing on equilibrium allocations and prices. Households in equilibrium only trade the stock
(i.e. the market portfolio), regardless of their history of idiosyncratic shocks, even in the presence
of binding solvency constraints. This invariance of the household’s portfolio composition directly
implies the irrelevance of the history of aggregate shocks for equilibrium prices and allocations.
This ﬁnding has several important consequences beyond the asset pricing irrelevance result.
First, it implies that the wealth and consumption distribution in the model with aggregate risk
1Weil’s (1989) statement of the risk-free rate puzzle, on the contrary, does not.
2(normalized by the aggregate endowment) coincides with the stationary wealth distribution of the
Bewley equilibrium. Aggregate shocks therefore have no impact on these equilibrium distributions.2
In the Bewley model, due to the absence of aggregate risk, a bond and a stock have exactly
the same return characteristics in equilibrium and thus one asset is redundant. Households need
not use the bond to smooth consumption. This portfolio implication carries over to the model
with aggregate risk: at equilibrium prices households do not need to trade the uncontingent bond
and only use the stock, i.e. a claim to aggregate consumption, to transfer resources over time
and to self-insure against idiosyncratic labor earnings risk. In equilibrium, all households bear the
same share of aggregate risk and they all hold the same portfolio, regardless of their history of
idiosyncratic shocks and the implied ﬁnancial wealth holdings. Hence, this class of models does not
generate any demand for bonds at the equilibrium interest rate, if bonds are in zero net supply.3
To interpret our portfolio result it is important to note that in the model, what we refer to as
the stock is a claim to aggregate consumption. We show this is the only security households trade.
However, if we take equity to be a levered claim to aggregate consumption, then households in
our model eﬀectively hold a ﬁxed portfolio of corporate bonds and stocks. As is easy to verify, the
proportion of corporate bonds in the portfolio is 2/3 when corporate leverage is 2. The remaining
1/3 is in equities. A key implication of the equilibrium we derive is that all households choose not
to deviate from these ﬁxed proportions.
We also show that making markets more complete does not always lead to more consumption
smoothing in equilibrium. In the benchmark model with i.i.d. aggregate endowment growth,
allowing agents to trade claims on payoﬀs that are contingent on aggregate shocks, in addition
to the risk-free bond and the stock, leaves their equilibrium consumption allocations unaltered.
Agents still only trade the stock, and there are no eﬀects of introducing these additional state
contingent claims on interest rates and asset prices.
In our benchmark model, aggregate consumption growth is not predictable (that is, the growth
rate of the aggregate endowment is i.i.d.). This is a standard assumption in the asset pricing
literature (e.g. Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), because the empirical evidence for predictability
is rather weak (see e.g. Heaton and Lucas (1996)). It is also a natural benchmark, because in this
case all the dynamics in the conditional market price of risk, if any, comes from the model itself
2Since stationary equilibria in Bewley models are relatively straightforward to compute, our result implies an
algorithm for computing equilibria in this class of models which appears to be simpler than the auctioneer algorithm
devised by Lucas (1994) and its extension to economies with a continuum of agents. There is also no need for
computing a law of motion for the aggregate wealth distribution, or approximating it by a ﬁnite number of moments,
as in Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998). This result also implies the existence of a recursive competitive equilibrium
with only asset holdings in the state space. Kubler and Schmedders (2002) establish the existence of such an
equilibrium in more general models, but only under very strong conditions. Miao (2005) relaxes these conditions,
but he includes continuation utilities in the state space.
3Of course, excluding some households from the stock market would force them to trade bonds for consumption
smoothing purposes, invalidating the irrelevance result.
3rather than the exogenously speciﬁed aggregate consumption growth process. However, if there
is predictability in aggregate income growth in our model, we show that agents want to hedge
their portfolio against interest rate shocks, creating a role for trade in a richer menu of assets than
just the stock. The risk premium irrelevance result, however, still applies as long as households
can trade a full set of aggregate state-contingent claims, provided that solvency constraints do not
bind in equilibrium. Therefore only a weaker form of our result survives when predictability in
aggregate consumption growth is allowed for. In contrast, in the autarchic equilibria examined
by Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996), their irrelevance result does not depend on the properties of
aggregate consumption growth.
The key assumptions underlying our irrelevance result are (i) a continuum of agents, (ii) CRRA
utility, (iii) idiosyncratic labor income risk that is independent of aggregate risk, (iv) a constant
capital share of income and (v) solvency constraints or borrowing constraints on total ﬁnancial
wealth that are proportional to aggregate income. We now discuss each of these assumptions in
detail to highlight and explain the diﬀerences with existing papers in the literature.
First, we require the economy to be populated by a continuum of agents. As forcefully pointed
out by Denhaan (2001), in an economy with a ﬁnite number of agents, each idiosyncratic shock is
by construction an aggregate shock because it changes the wealth distribution and, through these
wealth eﬀects, asset prices.
Second, our results rely on the homogeneity property of the CRRA utility function. Third, in
our model labor income grows with the aggregate endowment, as is standard in this literature.4
In addition, for our results to go through, idiosyncratic income shocks must be distributed inde-
pendently of aggregate shocks. This explicitly rules out that the variance of idiosyncratic shocks is
higher in recessions (henceforth we refer to this type of correlation as countercyclical cross-sectional
variance of labor income shocks, or CCV).
Fourth, we require the assumption that the capital share of income is independent of the
aggregate state of the economy. This assumption is standard in macroeconomics, and it is not
obviously at odds with the data (see e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995)).
Finally, in the main section of the paper, households face either constraints on total net wealth
today or state-by-state solvency constraints on the value of their portfolio in each state tomorrow.
These solvency constraints have to be proportional to aggregate income. If this were not the case,
the tightness of the constraints would depend on the aggregate history of shocks, invalidating our
map from equilibria of the Bewley model into equilibria of the model with stochastic aggregate
endowment growth.5 Apart from the proportionality condition the solvency constraints we can
4By contrast, Weil (1992) derives a positive eﬀect of background risk on the risk premium in a two-period model
in which labor income is not proportional to the aggregate endowment. This non-homotheticity invalidates our
mapping from the growing to the stationary economy.
5This assumption is less restrictive than it appears. Constraints arising from limited commitment, as e.g. in
Alvarez and Jermann (2000) satisfy this restriction, as do the tight borrowing constraints used by Krusell and Smith
4permit are very general. Also note that in the case in which aggregate consumption growth is
uncorrelated over time, we can allow for arbitrary separate constraints on the household bond
positions, e.g. a short-sale constraint for bonds only. In the i.i.d. aggregate consumption growth
case households choose only to trade the stock to smooth their consumption. Therefore, in this
benchmark case, our result is also robust to the introduction of transaction costs in the bond
market (but not to such costs in the stock market).
Our irrelevance result is robust along many empirically important dimensions. It does not
hinge on mean-reversion in labor income as it also goes through in the case of permanent id-
iosyncratic shocks. If the idiosyncratic part of household income follows a logarithmic random
walk, equilibria still feature trade in general. In fact, it is easy to show that in this case autarchy
is an equilibrium if and only if all assets are in zero net supply, that is if and only if there is
no net wealth in the economy. Constantinides and Duﬃe (henceforth CD) (1996) also consider
an environment in which agents face only permanent idiosyncratic income shocks and in which
they can trade stocks and bonds. They choose a (somewhat non-standard) stochastic household
income process where household labor income depends on aggregate dividends that delivers an
autarchic equilibrium even in the case of positive net wealth. CD’s results also imply that if the
cross-sectional variance of consumption growth is orthogonal to returns, then the equilibrium risk
premium is equal to the one in the representative agent model. We show that this characterization
of the household consumption process is indeed the correct one in equilibrium in a large class of
incomplete market models with standard household labor income processes, including those with
permanent idiosyncratic shocks.6 Relative to CD, our paper adds potentially binding solvency or
borrowing constraints. Moreover, our equilibrium does feature trade in ﬁnancial markets, and we
do not make any assumptions about the distribution of the underlying idiosyncratic shocks. The
consumption growth distribution across households in our model is the endogenous, equilibrium
outcome of these trades, but we can still fully characterize equilibrium asset prices.7
However, we also show that only a weaker irrelevance result survives when we allow for pre-
dictability (serial correlation) in aggregate consumption growth, because diﬀerent households have
diﬀerent hedging demands to insure against interest rate shocks and the hedging demands give
rise to trade in the contingent bond markets. In CD’s autarchic equilibrium, idiosyncratic risk is
not priced regardless of the properties of aggregate consumption growth. So, introducing equilib-
rium trade does matter. This is also means that contingent (on aggregate shocks) claims markets
(1997) and may others.
6Krebs (2006) derives the same result in a production economy with human capital accumulation.
7In a separate class of continuous-time diﬀusion models, Grossman and Shiller (1982) have demonstrated that
idiosyncratic risk has no eﬀect on risk premia, simply because the cross-sectional variance of consumption growth
is locally deterministic. Our irrelevance result is obtained in a diﬀerent class of discrete-time incomplete market
models in which uninsurable idiosyncratic background risk does potentially matter, as shown by Mankiw (1986),
CD (1996) and others.
5are needed and borrowing constraints cannot bind in order to obtain aggregation in models with
long-run risk, like the one considered by Bansal and Yaron (2004).
Finally, the irrelevance result survives cyclicality in the aggregate capital share and preference
heterogeneity, but only in special cases. In the case of stochastic variation in the capital share
households can keep their consumption in line with aggregate consumption by taking positions in
the contingent bond market, but only if the variation in the aggregate labor income share does not
lead to variation in the distribution of idiosyncratic labor income shocks and activate the CCV
mechanism. If this condition is satisﬁed, the irrelevance result survives. In the case of preference
heterogeneity, a weaker version of the irrelevance result remains valid if less risk averse households
have labor income that is more exposed to aggregate risk. In both cases, trade in a richer menu of
assets that include aggregate state-contingent claims is required.
We characterize equilibria in the model with aggregate risk that are derived from Bewley equi-
libria8 by scaling allocations by the aggregate endowment. While we cannot formally rule out the
existence of other types of equilibria, we conjecture that the equilibria that we characterize are
the only ones. Moreover, since we have derived at least one class of equilibria in which market
incompleteness has no bearing on risk premia, it seems hard to argue that this class of models
robustly generates larger risk premia than the representative agent model. Finally, we also demon-
strate that the irrelevance result continues to hold even when we allow for endogenous labor supply
decisions and production.
Related Literature In the quest towards the resolution of the equity premium puzzle identiﬁed
by Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Mehra and Prescott (1985), uninsurable idiosyncratic income
risk has been introduced into standard dynamic general equilibrium models.9 Incomplete insurance
of household consumption against idiosyncratic income risk was introduced into quantitative asset
pricing models by Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Marcet and Singleton
(1999) and others. Their main result, derived numerically for various parameterizations, can be
summarized as suggesting that the impact of uninsurable labor income risk per se has only small
eﬀects on the equity premium. The main contribution of our paper is to establish theoretically
that, under a set of fairly general conditions spelled out above and further discussed below10,
adding uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk to the standard consumption based asset pricing
model does not alter the asset pricing implications of the model with respect to excess returns at
8For our equivalence and asset pricing results there is no need to assume or show that the Bewley equilibrium
is unique. Thus our results imply that there is at least one equilibrium in the incomplete markets model with
idiosyncratic and aggregate risk that has the same market price of risk as the standard representative agent model.
9For examples, see the work of Ayiagari and Gertler (1991), Telmer (1993), Lucas (1994), Heaton and Lucas
(1996), Krusell and Smith (1998), and Marcet and Singleton (1999). Also see Kocherlakota (1996) for an overview
of this literature.
10Evidently in all quantitative papers cited above at least one of the assumptions we make is relaxed.
6all. Our theoretical result holds regardless of how tight the solvency constraints are, how persistent
the income process is and how much agents discount the future. It is therefore independent of the
degree of consumption smoothing that can be achieved by households that face idiosyncratic income
shocks. In equilibrium, all households bear the same amount of aggregate risk, and accordingly,
they are only compensated in equilibrium for the aggregate consumption growth risk they take on
by investing in stocks.
Most of the work on incomplete markets and risk premia focuses on the moments of model-
generated data for particular calibrations of the model, but there are few general theoretical results.
Levine and Zame (2002) show that in economies populated by agents with inﬁnite horizons, the
equilibrium allocations converge in the limit, as their discount factors approach one, to the com-
plete markets allocations. Consequently, the pricing implications of the incomplete markets model
converge to that of the representative agent model as households become perfectly patient. We
provide a qualitatively similar equivalence result that applies only to the risk premium. Our result,
however, does not depend on the time discount factor of households. For households with CARA
utility, closed form solutions of the individual decision problem in incomplete markets models with
idiosyncratic risk are sometimes available, as Willen (1999) shows.11 In contrast to Willen, we
employ CRRA preferences, and we obtain an unambiguous (and negative) result for the impact
of uninsurable income risk for the equity premium in case the distribution of individual income
shocks is independent of aggregate shocks.
There is a large empirical literature that documents a strong correlation in the data between
ﬁnancial wealth and equity holdings (see e.g. Campbell (2006) ). We show analytically that the
history of a household’s idiosyncratic shocks and hence their ﬁnancial wealth has no bearing on
their portfolio choice in a large class of incomplete markets models.
The result of our paper that equilibria in the model with aggregate risk can be obtained from
equilibria of the stationary Bewley model also makes contact with the literature on aggregation.
Constantinides (1982), building on work by Negishi (1960) and Wilson (1968), derives an aggrega-
tion result for heterogenous agents in complete market models, implying that assets can be priced
oﬀ the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of an agent who consumes the aggregate en-
dowment. Rubinstein (1974) obtains an aggregation result without assuming complete markets,
but he does not allow for non-traded assets such as risky labor income. Our ﬁndings extend these
aggregation results to a large class of incomplete market models with idiosyncratic income shocks,
but the result only applies to excess returns. Alvarez and Jermann (2000, 2001) derive a similar
result, but they consider a diﬀerent trading arrangement; in the AJ-model, agents trade a complete
menu of assets subject to binding solvency constraints. Instead, the focus of our paper is on what
happens when exactly these markets for idiosyncratic risk are shut down.
11CARA utility eliminates wealth eﬀects which crucially simpliﬁes the analysis. Angeletos and Calvet (2006)
examine the private equity premium in an environment with idiosyncratic risk and agents with CARA utility.
7Roadmap The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we lay out the physical environment of
our model. Before analyzing the inﬁnite horizon economy, section 3 considers a two-period example,
to develop some intuition for our main results in a version of the model that permits a full analytical
solution. Section 4 then analyzes the general inﬁnite horizon model. This section demonstrates
how to transform a model where aggregate income grows stochastically into a stationary model
with a constant aggregate endowment. In subsection 4.1 we study this stationary model, called
the Bewley model henceforth. The next section, subsection 4.2, introduces the Arrow model, a
model with aggregate uncertainty and a full set of Arrow securities whose payoﬀs are contingent
on the realization of the aggregate shock. We show that any equilibrium of the Bewley model can
be mapped into an equilibrium of the Arrow model just by scaling up allocations by the aggregate
endowment. In subsection 4.3 we derive the same result for a model where only a one-period
risk-free bond and the stock can be traded. We call this the Bond model. Section 5 shows that
risk premia in the representative agent Breeden-Lucas (BL) model and the Arrow model (and
by implication, in the Bond model) coincide. Section 6 investigates the robustness of our results
with respect to the assumptions about the underlying stochastic income process, and shows in
particular that most of our results can be extended to the case in which the aggregate shocks are
correlated over time and to the case of permanent household income shocks. We also explains how
cyclicality in the capital income share weakens our result. Finally, section 7 concludes; all proofs
are contained in the appendix.
2 Environment
Our exchange economy is populated by a continuum of individuals of measure 1. There is a
single nonstorable consumption good. The aggregate endowment of this good is stochastic. Each
individual’s endowment depends, in addition to the aggregate shock, also on the realization of an
idiosyncratic shock. Thus, the model we study is identical to the one described by Lucas (1994),
except that ours is populated by a continuum of agents (as in Bewley (1986), Aiyagari and Gertler
(1991), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994)), instead of just two agents.
2.1 Representation of Uncertainty
We denote the current aggregate shock by zt ∈ Z and the current idiosyncratic shock by yt ∈ Y .
For simplicity, both Z and Y are assumed to be ﬁnite. Furthermore, let zt = (z0,...,zt) and
yt = (y0,...,yt) denote the history of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. As shorthand notation,
we use st = (yt,zt) and st = (yt,zt). We let the economy start at an initial aggregate node z0.
Conditional on an idiosyncratic shock y0 and thus s0 = (y0,z0), the probability of a history st
is given by πt(st|s0). We assume that shocks follow a ﬁrst order Markov process with transition
8probabilities given by π(s′|s).
2.2 Preferences and Endowments














where γ > 0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and β ∈ (0,1) is the constant time discount
factor. We deﬁne U(c)(st) to be the continuation expected lifetime utility from a consumption








where we made use of the Markov property the underlying stochastic processes. The economy’s
aggregate endowment process {et} depends only on the aggregate event history; we let et(zt) denote
the aggregate endowment at node zt. Each agent draws a ‘labor income’ share η(yt,zt), as a fraction
of the aggregate endowment in each period. Her labor income share only depends on the current
individual and aggregate event. We denote the resulting individual labor income process by {ηt},
with
ηt(s
t) = (1 − α(zt))η(yt,zt)et(z
t), (2)
where st = (st−1,yt,zt). We assume that η(yt,zt) > 0 in all states of the world. The stochastic
growth rate of the endowment of the economy is denoted by λ(zt+1) = et+1(zt+1)/et(zt). We assume
that aggregate endowment growth only depends on the current aggregate state.
Condition 2.1. Aggregate endowment growth is a function of the current aggregate shock only:
λ(z
t+1) = λ(zt+1).
Furthermore, we assume that a Law of Large Numbers holds12, so that π(st|s0) is not only a
household’s individual probability of receiving income ηt(st), but also the fraction of the population
receiving that income.
In addition to labor income, there is a Lucas tree that yields a share α(z) of the total aggregate
endowment as capital income, so that the total dividends of the tree are given by α(zt)et(zt) in each
period. The remaining fraction of the total endowment accrues to individuals as labor income, so
12See e.g. Hammond and Sun (2003) for conditions under which a LLN holds with a continuum of random
variables.
9that 1−α(z) denotes the labor income share. Therefore, by construction, the labor shares sum to
one:  
yt∈Y
Πzt(yt)η(yt,zt) = 1, (3)
for all zt, where Πzt(yt) represents the cross-sectional distribution of idiosyncratic shocks yt, con-
ditional on the aggregate shock zt. By the law of large numbers, the fraction of agents who draw
y in state z only depends on z.13 At time 0, the agents are endowed with initial wealth θ0. This
wealth represents the value of an agent’s share of the Lucas tree producing the dividend ﬂow in
units of time 0 consumption, as well as the value of her labor endowment at date 0. We use Θ0 to
denote the initial joint distribution of wealth and idiosyncratic shocks (θ0,y0).
This concludes our description of the physical environment. We start our analysis by studying a
two-period example of our model in which prices and allocations can be characterized analytically
to develop some intuition for the irrelevance result, when it holds and when it breaks down. We
use the model to illustrate the importance of the conditions that we have listed as suﬃcient for
our result: (i) a continuum of agents, (ii) CRRA utility, (iii) idiosyncratic labor income risk that is
independent of aggregate risk, (iv) a constant capital share of income and (v) solvency constraints
or borrowing constraints on total ﬁnancial wealth that are proportional to aggregate income.
3 A Two Period Example
We consider a simple example in which the economy only lasts for two periods, t = 0,1, and
there are only two possible realizations of the aggregate state. In the ﬁrst period, there is no
uncertainty and the initial aggregate state of the economy is ﬁxed at z0 ∈ Z = {zl,zh}. There is
no heterogeneity in initial endowments or income realizations among agents in period 0. In the
second period, an aggregate shock is realized z1 ∈ Z = {zl,zh} with z1 ∼ φ(z1|z0), as well as an
idiosyncratic shock y1 ∈ Y, with y1 ∼ π(y1|z1). We use the following notation: z1 = (z0,z1) and
s1 = (s0,s1) with s0 = z1 and s1 = (y1,z1). Initial shares in the Lucas tree are given by σ−1 = 1
for all households; initial ﬁnancial assets excluding shares in the Lucas tree are given by a−1 = 0.
The aggregate endowment in period 0, e0(z0), is not subject to randomness, but the aggregate
endowment in period 1 depends on the realization of the aggregate shock: e1(z1) = e0(z0)λ(z1).
In period 1, the Lucas tree yields a fraction α(z1) of the aggregate endowment in the form of
dividends, the remainder, 1−α(z1) consists of labor income. The individual labor endowments in
13Our setup nests the baseline model of Heaton and Lucas (1996), except for the fact that they allow for the
capital share α to depend on z.
10the ﬁrst and second period are given by:
η0(s0) = (1 − α(z0))e0(z0)
η1(s
1) = (1 − α(z1))η(y1,z1)e0(z0)λ(z1).
Household Problem In our baseline model (we will refer to this as the Arrow model), house-
holds trade two diﬀerent contingent bonds with payoﬀs contingent on the two aggregate shocks
as well as shares in the Lucas tree. Here, households trade a full set of Arrow securities against
aggregate risk, but not against idiosyncratic risk. We use a0(s0,z1) to denote the holdings of bond
that pays oﬀ one unit of consumption if z1 is realized and we use q0(z0,z1) to denote the price of
this security. We refer to these as Arrow prices. The household chooses a consumption allocation
{c0(θ0,s0),c1(θ0,s1)}, contingent bond positions {a0(θ0,s0,z1 = zl),a0(θ0,s0,z1 = zh)} and shares
















a0(θ0,s0,z1)q0(z0,z1) + σ0(θ0,s0)v0(z0) = θ0(s0),
and the budget constraint in period 1:
c1(θ0,s
1) ≡ η(s
1) + a0(θ0,s0,z1) + σ0(θ0,s0)αe1(z
1).





a0(θ0,s0,z1)dΘ0 = 0 for all z1
 
c0(θ0,s0)dΘ0 = e0(z0)
   
y1∈Y
c1(θ0,s
1)π(y1|z1)dΘ0 = e1(z1) for all z1
11In the remainder, we leave out the obvious dependence on initial wealth θ0, which is trivial in this
example since there is no heterogeneity across households in θ0.
3.1 Irrelevance Result
In this example the equilibrium features no trade, as in Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996); note
that this will not be the case in our general model in the remainder of the paper. In equilib-
rium all households simply hold on to their initial shares in the Lucas tree (σ0(s0) = 1), and
contingent bond markets are inoperative (a0(s0,z1) = 0 for all z1). In the ﬁrst period, house-
holds consume the average endowment c0(s0) = e0(z0), and in the second period they consume
c1(s1) = [(1 − α(z1))η(y1,z1) + α(z1)]e1(z1) for all z1.
In this no-trade equilibrium, we can analytically characterize the ratio of the Arrow prices
q0(z0,zh)
q0(z0,zl) in the two diﬀerent aggregate states. We use m(c1(s1),c0(s0)) =
u′(c1(s1))
u′(c0(s0)) to denote the
household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (MRS henceforth) as a function of con-
sumption in the ﬁrst and second period.
Proposition 3.1. There exists a no-trade equilibrium of the two-period economy without trade in
the contingent bond and stock markets. The ratio of the prices of the Arrow securities in the two








y1 π(y1|zh)m([(1 − α(zh))η(y1,zh) + α(zh)]λ(zh)e0(z0),e0(z0))
 
y1 π(y1|zl)m([(1 − α(zl))η(y1,zl) + α(zl)]λ(zl)e0(z0),e0(z0))
(4)
In this equilibrium, all households choose the same exposure to aggregate consumption growth
risk by holding one share in the Lucas tree and no contingent bonds. The key to the irrelevance
result that idiosyncratic risk does not aﬀect risk premia is that the ratio of Arrow prices in the two
aggregate states is the same in the representative agent model and the model with idiosyncratic
risk. This being the case, market incompleteness only raises the price of a unit of consumption by
the same amount in the good and the bad aggregate state, but it does not change the premium











Hence, by comparing this expression with the incomplete markets analogue in equation (4), it





y1 π(y1|zh)m([(1 − α(zh))η(y1,zh) + α(zh)]λ(zh)e0(z0),e0(z0))
 
y1 π(y1|zl)m([(1 − α(zl))η(y1,zl) + α(zl)]λ(zl)e0(z0),e0(z0))
. (5)
12Three conditions need to be satisﬁed in order to enforce this equality :
1. homogeneity of the period utility function: the CRRA utility function is homogeneous of degree
1 − γ
2. independence of idiosyncratic shocks and aggregate shocks: this rules out CCV (counter-cyclical
cross-sectional variance of income shocks)
3. constant capital income share
When independence (condition 2) is satisﬁed and when the capital income share is constant
(condition 3), household consumption in the second period is proportional to the aggregate en-
dowment (c1(s1) = [(1 − α)η(y1) + α]e1(z1)), and the constant of proportionality does not depend
on the aggregate shock, only the idiosyncratic shock. As a result, the ratio of state prices in the
incomplete markets economy simpliﬁes to:
 
y1 π(y1)m([(1 − α)η(y1) + α]λ(zh)e0(z0),e0(z0))
 
y1 π(y1)m([(1 − α)η(y1) + α]λ(zl)e0(z0),e0(z0))
,
but we still cannot separate the idiosyncratic shocks y1 from the aggregate shocks z1 ∈ {zl,zh}.
To do that, we need homogeneity of the utility function (condition 1). Since u is homogeneous of
degree 1−γ, it follows that the lifetime utility function is homogeneous of degree 1−γ and therefore
also homothetic.14 Furthermore it follows that marginal utility u′ is homogeneous of degree −γ.
From the homotheticity of the lifetime utility function and the homogeneity of degree −γ of
the marginal utility function it follows that the ratio of state prices in the representative agent












Similarly, given the same properties, the ratio of state prices in the incomplete markets economy
simpliﬁes to:
 
y1 π(y1)m([(1 − α)η(y1) + α]λ(zh)e0(z0),e0(z0))
 
y1 π(y1)m([(1 − α)η(y1) + α]λ(zl)e0(z0),e0(z0))
=
λ(zh)−γ  
y1 π(y1)m([(1 − α)η(y1) + α],1)
λ(zl)−γ  






Thus, the ratio of Arrow prices is the same in the representative agent model and the model with
idiosyncratic risk. To derive this result, we used the homogeneity of the lifetime utility function,
14The degree of homogeneity is of course irrelevant, all we need is that u is homogeneous of some degree, which
reduces the class of utility functions we can handle to the CRRA class.
13not the time-separability. This suggests that the irrelevance results carries over to Epstein-Zin
recursive preferences. We demonstrate in appendix C.3 that this is indeed the case.
The proportionality of household consumption to the aggregate endowment, combined with the
homogeneity assumption on preferences, are key for the asset pricing irrelevance result: market
incompleteness raises the price of a unit of consumption by the same amount in the good and in
the bad aggregate state, but leaves their ratio unchanged. These results carry over exactly to the
general model in which there is trade in equilibrium.
Market Structure To demonstrate our results in the general model we proceed as in the sim-
ple example, by ﬁrst arguing that the equilibrium consumption allocation of households can be
decomposed into an idiosyncratic part and an aggregate part that is proportional to the aggregate
endowment, and then showing that this characterization of allocations implies the asset pricing
results. In order to do so, we use four models, whose main characteristics are summarized in table
1. The ﬁrst three models are endowment models with aggregate shocks. The models diﬀer along
two dimensions, namely whether agents can trade a full set of Arrow securities against aggregate
shocks, and whether agents face idiosyncratic risk, in addition to aggregate risk. Idiosyncratic risk,
if there is any, is never directly insurable.
Our primary goal is to understand asset prices in the ﬁrst model in the table, the Bond model.
This model has idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, as well as incomplete markets (against idiosyn-
cratic and aggregate shocks). Agents can only insure against idiosyncratic and aggregate risk by
trading a single bond and a stock. The second model, the Arrow model, diﬀers from the bond
model only in the availability of a full set of aggregate state-contingent claims. We analyzed a
two-period version of the Arrow model to derive the irrelevance result above, but we found that
there is no trade in the contingent bond markets. This implies that our irrelevance results for the
two-period economy immediately carries over to two-period Bond economy, in which agents can
only trade a stock and a non-contingent bond.15 Because of the result that idiosyncratic household
consumption is proportional to aggregate consumption, excess returns in the Bond and Arrow
model are priced as in the standard representative agent complete markets Breeden (1979)-Lucas
(1978) (BL) model, which does not have idiosyncratic risk.
15With two shocks a bond and a stock complete the markets, so restricting the number of aggregate shocks to
two automatically generates the equivalence between the Arrow model and the Bond model. In the general model
aggregate shocks can take an abritrary (ﬁnite) number of values, and thus the two models do not trivally deliver
the same results.
14Table 1: Summary of Four Models
Environment Trading
Model Idiosyncr. Shocks Aggregate Shocks Arrow Securities Bond and Stock
Bond Yes Yes No Yes
Arrow Yes Yes Yes Yes
BL No Yes Yes Yes
Bewley Yes No N/A Yes
These results carry over to the inﬁnite horizon economy. However, in the two-period economy,
the equilibrium allocations are autarchic. They are not in the inﬁnite horizon economy. The
fundamental result underlying our asset pricing ﬁndings is that equilibrium allocations in both
the Bond and the Arrow model can be found by ﬁrst determining equilibria in a model with only
idiosyncratic risk (the Bewley model henceforth, the fourth row in the table) and then by simply
scaling consumption allocations in that model by the stochastic aggregate endowment. As in the
simple model, household consumption is therefore proportional to aggregate consumption, and the
asset pricing results immediately follow.
3.2 Robustness
We brieﬂy consider the robustness of this irrelevance result in the two-period economy to solvency
constraints, cyclicality in the labor income share and preference heterogeneity. Basically, as long
as households can keep their consumption proportional to aggregate consumption (or a levered
version thereof), the irrelevance result goes through.
Solvency Constraints The households face solvency constraints in the second period that put
a lower bound on net wealth in each state z1:
a0(s0,z1) + σ0(s0)αe1(z
1) ≥ K1(z1)
If we assume that the lower bound is proportional to the aggregate endowment, K1(z1) =   K1e1(z1),
then the solvency constraint simpliﬁes to:
a0(s0,z1)
e1(z1)
+ σ0(s0)α ≥   K1
Since the right hand side of the constraint does not depend on the aggregate shock realization,
households can still choose a0(s0,z1) = 0 in equilibrium, as before. Thus, the irrelevance result
survives solvency constraints that are proportional to the aggregate endowment. However, if
15  K1(z1) depends on the realization of the aggregate shock, this no-trade equilibrium may not be
implementable without violating the solvency constraints in some aggregate state.
Counter-cyclical Labor Income Share If the capital share α depends on z1, then the no-
trade equilibrium still obtains but the ratio of state prices in the representative agent and the
Arrow models are not identical, as can be seen from equation 4, simply because second period
consumption is no longer simply proportional to the aggregate endowment; the fraction of the
aggregate endowment consumed by households depends on the realization of the aggregate shock.16
There is one important exception. Suppose the individual labor endowments are given by the
following additive speciﬁcation:
η0(s0) = (1 − α)e0(z0) + (α − α(z0))e0(z0)
η1(s
1) = (1 − α)η(y1,z1)e0(z0)λ(z1) + (α − α(z1))e0(z0)λ(z1),
In this case, the realization of the aggregate shock does not aﬀect the ratio of state prices and we
obtain the same equality of the ratios in the representative agent economy and the economy with
idiosyncratic risk, because the labor income and capital income share eﬀect oﬀset each other if the
households all hold the same amount of shares in the Lucas tree. A less trivial version of this result
carries over to the inﬁnite horizon economy, but it requires households to trade in the contingent
bond market to oﬀset the labor income ﬂuctuations induced by the term α(z0)e0(z0). The crucial
feature of this additive speciﬁcation is that the cross-sectional distribution of labor income shares
remains independent of the aggregate shocks, as can easily be veriﬁed. If idiosyncratic labor
income would aﬀected multiplicatively by the aggregate shock to the labor income share, the
cross-sectional distribution of labor income and its risk is aﬀected by the aggregate shock, in eﬀect
violating assumption 2.
Preference Heterogeneity Finally, we explore what happens if households have diﬀerent risk
attitudes. Suppose there are two classes of agents. The ﬁrst type is less risk averse than the second
type. Then the ﬁrst type of agents will seek more exposure to aggregate risk in equilibrium than
the second type. In order for the irrelevance result to hold we need to assume that the less risk









1) = (1 − α)η(y1,z1)(1 − χ1(z
1))(z1)
16Households cannot fully hedge against these aggregate shocks to their labor income share because the contingent
bond payoﬀ has to depend on both the idiosyncratic shock y and the aggregate shock z to neutralize the eﬀect of
the shock to the aggregate labor income share z.
16where the properties of χ1(z1) will be discussed below. Schulhofer-Wohl (2008) shows that, empir-
ically, risk-tolerant workers hold jobs whose earnings carry more aggregate risk. This is plausible
because their shadow valuations of these earnings is higher. In the ﬁrst period labor income for
both groups is given by η1
0(s0) = χ0(z0)e0(z0) and η2
0(s0) = (1 − χ0(z0))e0(z0).









1) ≡ [(1 − α)η(y1,z1) + α(z1)]χ1(z
1)e1(z
1)
where χ1(z0,zl) < 1 < χ1(z0,zh) is chosen such that the MRS of the stand-in agent who consumes












in each aggregate history z1. While household consumption for the less risk averse group is not
proportional to the aggregate endowment, it is proportional to a levered up version thereof. Hence,
the ratio of state prices in the economy without idiosyncratic risk (and thus a representative agent









for agents of type 1. Similarly, the ratio of state prices in the incomplete markets economy with
idiosyncratic risk simpliﬁes to:
 
y1 π(y1)m1([(1 − α)η(y1) + α]χ1(z0,zh)λ(zh)e0(z0),χ0(z0)e0(z0))
 







for agents of type 1, and thus the ratio of state prices
q0(z0,zh)
q0(z0,zl) is the same in the model without
and the model with idiosyncratic risk. This does not mean that preference heterogeneity leaves
risk premia unaﬀected; but it implies that it aﬀects risk premia in the same way in both the model
with idiosyncratic risk and the model with a representative agent per household group, as ﬁrst
analyzed by Dumas (1989).17
We conjecture that the same results go through in the inﬁnite horizon economy, as long we can
17Recent papers that explore preference heterogeneity as a vehicle for time variation in risk premia include Chan
and Kogan (2002) and Garleanu and Panageas (2007).
17tune the aggregate risk exposure of the labor income processes for each group of households in the
same way as in the two period example. Under these conditions, the least risk averse households
as a group are more exposed to aggregate risk than the most risk averse households, but the within
group wealth dynamics are invariant with respect to the history of aggregate shocks.18
Summary This simple model conveys the main intuition. In spite of the idiosyncratic shocks,
households simply want to keep their individual consumption lined up with aggregate consumption,
and if conditions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed, they can do so. If condition 3 holds as well, this also implies
that risk premia are unaﬀected.
What is missing in the two-period model? In the no-trade equilibrium of the two-period version
of our economy, securities markets are inoperative, and the allocations are autarchic. However, we
will show that the basic irrelevance result carries over to equilibria which do feature equilibrium
trade in an inﬁnite horizon version of this economy: The zero (contingent) bond trade result,
which holds by construction in this simple economy, turns out to carry over to the inﬁnite horizon
economy, if aggregate shocks are i.i.d., but the zero stock trade result does not, in that households
in the general model will trade the stock for consumption-smoothing purposes. As a result, in
the inﬁnite horizon version of this economy, we need to solve a Bewley model to compute the
equilibrium allocations (and the risk-free rate).
In addition, the simple two-period model with its autarchic equilibrium by construction does
not display cross-sectional dispersion or variation in the wealth distribution. Therefore this model
is silent about what is needed for the cross-sectional distribution of wealth and consumption to be
nonstochastic and how wealth dispersion aﬀects asset prices. In the general model a continuum
of agents is needed to obtain an equilibrium with a wealth distribution that is nonstochastic,
which is key for the asset pricing irrelevance result since prices depend on the wealth distribution.
In the two-period example the irrelevance result can be established even with a ﬁnite number
of agents, whereas in the general model with ﬁnitely many households household-speciﬁc shocks
move the wealth distribution and thus asset prices. Second, when aggregate shocks are non-i.i.d.,
interest rates are stochastic. Households in the inﬁnite horizon economy want to hedge against this
risk. Diﬀerent households have diﬀerent hedging demands depending on their net ﬁnancial wealth
position. This wealth heterogeneity creates trade in the contingent bond markets. In contrast, the
two period model cannot capture these inter-temporal hedging motives, and the importance the
wealth distribution has for these motives.
We therefore now turn to the theoretical analysis of the general model.
18This being the case, the excess returns on any asset can be priced oﬀ the consumption of each group.
184 General Results in the Inﬁnite Horizon Economy
Most of our results for the inﬁnite horizon economy are derived in a de-trended version of our
model. This de-trended model features a constant aggregate endowment and a growth-adjusted
transition probability matrix. The agents in this de-trended model, discussed now, have stochastic
time discount factors.
Transformation of the Growth Model into a Stationary Model We transform our grow-
ing model into a stationary model with a stochastic time discount rate and a growth-adjusted
probability matrix, following Alvarez and Jermann (2001). First, we deﬁne growth deﬂated con-
















Note that ˆ π is a well-deﬁned Markov matrix in that
 
st+1 ˆ π(st+1|st) = 1 for all st and that ˆ β(st)
is stochastic as long as the original Markov process is not iid over time. For future reference, we
also deﬁne the time zero discount factor applied to utils at time t:
ˆ β(s
t) = ˆ β(s0) · ... · ˆ β(st)
and we note that
ˆ β(st)
ˆ β(st−1) = ˆ β(st). Finally, we let ˆ U(ˆ c)(st) denote the lifetime expected continu-
ation utility in node st, under the new transition probabilities and discount factor, deﬁned over
consumption shares {ˆ ct(st)}
ˆ U(ˆ c)(s
t) = u(ˆ ct(s
t)) + ˆ β(st)
 
st+1
ˆ π(st+1|st)ˆ U(ˆ c)(s
t,st+1). (7)
In the appendix we prove that this transformation does not alter the agents’ ranking of diﬀerent
consumption streams.
Proposition 4.1. Households rank consumption share allocations in the de-trended model in ex-
actly the same way as they rank the corresponding consumption allocations in the original model




t) ⇐⇒ ˆ U(ˆ c)(s
t) ≥ ˆ U(ˆ c
′)(s
t)
19where the transformation of consumption into consumption shares is given by (6).
This result is crucial for demonstrating that equilibrium allocations c for the stochastically
growing model can be found by solving for equilibrium allocations ˆ c in the transformed model.
To derive the irrelevance result in the inﬁnite horizon economy, we need to impose more struc-
ture on the environment, speciﬁcally on the interaction between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.
Independence of Idiosyncratic Shocks from Aggregate Conditions We assume that id-
iosyncratic shocks are independent of the aggregate shocks. This assumption is crucial for most of
the results in this paper.
Condition 4.1. Individual endowment shares η(yt,zt) are functions of the current idiosyncratic
state yt only, that is η(yt,zt) = η(yt). Also, transition probabilities of the shocks can be decomposed
as
π(zt+1,yt+1|zt,yt) = ϕ(yt+1|yt)φ(zt+1|zt).
That is, individual endowment shares and the transition probabilities of the idiosyncratic shocks
are independent of the aggregate state of the economy z. In this case, the growth-adjusted prob-
ability matrix ˆ π and the re-scaled discount factor is obtained by adjusting only the transition
probabilities for the aggregate shock, φ, but not the transition probabilities for the idiosyncratic
shocks:




Furthermore, the growth-adjusted discount factor only depends on the aggregate state zt:





We assume that maxzt ˆ β(zt) < 1 in order to insure that lifetime utility remains ﬁnite. Evidently
this jointly restricts the time discount factor β, the endowment growth process and the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion γ.
The ﬁrst part of our analysis (section 5 included) also assumes that the aggregate shocks are
independent over time:
Condition 4.2. Aggregate endowment growth is i.i.d.:
φ(zt+1|zt) = φ(zt+1).
20In this case the growth rate of aggregate endowment is uncorrelated over time, so that the
logarithm of the aggregate endowment follows a random walk with drift.19 As a result, the growth-
adjusted discount factor is a constant: ˆ β(zt) = ˆ β, since ˆ φ(zt+1|zt) = ˆ φ(zt+1). There are two
competing eﬀects on the growth-adjusted discount rate: consumption growth itself makes agents
more impatient, while the consumption risk makes them more patient.20
Finally, we rule out cyclicality in the labor income share:
Condition 4.3. The labor income share (1 − α) is constant.
We will relax some of these assumption in section 6.
We start our analysis of the inﬁnite horizon economy in section 4.1 by characterizing equilibria
for the Bewley model, a stationary model with a constant aggregate endowment in which agents
trade a single discount bond and a stock.21 This model merely serves as a device to compute
equilibrium allocations and prices. In the inﬁnite horizon economy, household consumption will
still be proportional to aggregate consumption in that the consumption share does not depend
on aggregate shocks, like in the two-period example, but now the consumption shares depend
on the household’s history of idiosyncratic shocks in potentially complicated ways. The Bewley
economy’s only purpose is to allow us to compute these consumption shares. Then we turn to
the stochastically growing economy (with diﬀerent market structures), the one whose asset pricing
implications we are interested in, and we show that equilibrium consumption allocations from the
Bewley model can be implemented as equilibrium allocations in the stochastically growing Arrow
model in section 4.2 and the Bond model in section 4.3.
4.1 The Bewley Model
In this model the aggregate endowment is constant and equal to 1. Households face idiosyncratic
shocks y that follow a Markov process with transition probabilities ϕ(y′|y). The household’s prefer-
ences over consumption shares {ˆ c(yt)} are deﬁned in equation (7), with the constant time discount
factor ˆ β as deﬁned in equation (8).
19In section 6 we show that most of our results survive the introduction of persistence in the growth rates if a
complete set of contingent claims on aggregate shocks is traded.
20The growth-adjusted measure ˆ φ is obviously connected to the risk-neutral measure commonly used in asset
pricing (Harrison and Kreps, 1979). Under our hatted measure, agents can evaluate utils from consumption streams
while abstracting from aggregate risk; under a risk-neutral measure, agents can price payoﬀs by simply discounting
at the risk-free rate.
21One of the two assets will be redundant for the households, so that this model is a standard Bewley model, as
studied by Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) or Aiyagari (1994). The presence of both assets will make it easier to
demonstrate our equivalence results with respect to the THL and Arrow model later on.
214.1.1 Market Structure
Agents trade only a riskless one-period discount bond and shares in a Lucas tree that yields safe
dividends of α in every period. The price of the Lucas tree at time t is denoted by vt.22 The riskless
bond is in zero net supply. Each household is indexed by an initial condition (θ0,y0), where θ0
denotes its wealth (including period 0 labor income) at time 0.
The household chooses consumption {ˆ ct(θ0,yt)}, bond positions {ˆ at(θ0,yt)} and share holdings







t)ˆ vt = (1 − α)η(yt) + ˆ at−1(y
t−1) + ˆ σt−1(y
t−1)(ˆ vt + α).
Finally, each household faces one of two types of borrowing constraints. The ﬁrst one restricts
household wealth at the end of the current period. The second one restricts household wealth at




t)ˆ vt ≥ ˆ Kt(y
t) for all y
t. (9)
ˆ at(y
t) + ˆ σt(y
t)(ˆ vt+1 + α) ≥ ˆ Mt(y
t) for all y
t. (10)
4.1.2 Equilibrium in the Bewley Model
The deﬁnition of equilibrium in this model is standard.
Deﬁnition 4.1. For an initial distribution Θ0 over (θ0,y0), a competitive equilibrium for the
Bewley model consists of trading strategies {ˆ ct(θ0,yt),ˆ at(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)}, and prices { ˆ Rt,ˆ vt} such
that
1. Given prices, trading strategies solve the household maximization problem
22The price of the tree is nonstochastic due to the absence of aggregate risk.
23We suppress dependence on θ0 for simplicity whenever there is no room for confusion.
24This distinction is redundant in the Bewley model, but it will become meaningful in our models with aggregate
risk.
222. The goods markets and asset markets clear in all periods t















In the absence of aggregate risk, the bond and the stock are perfect substitutes for households,
and no-arbitrage implies that the stock return equals the risk-free rate:
ˆ Rt =
ˆ vt+1 + α
ˆ vt
.
In addition, at these equilibrium prices, household portfolios are indeterminate. Without loss of
generality one can therefore focus on trading strategies in which households only trade the stock,
but not the bond: ˆ at(θ0,yt) ≡ 0.25
A stationary equilibrium in the Bewley model consists of a constant interest rate ˆ R, a share
price ˆ v, optimal household allocations and a time-invariant measure Φ over income shocks and
ﬁnancial wealth.26 In the stationary equilibrium, households move within the invariant wealth
distribution, but the wealth distribution itself is constant over time.
4.2 The Arrow Model
We now turn to our main object of interest, the model with aggregate risk. We ﬁrst consider
the Arrow market structure in which households can trade shares of the stock and a complete
menu of contingent claims on aggregate shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks are still uninsurable. We
demonstrate in this section that the allocations and prices of a stationary Bewley equilibrium can
be transformed into equilibrium allocations and prices in the Arrow model with aggregate risk.
4.2.1 Trading
Let at(st,zt+1) denote the quantity purchased of a security that pays oﬀ one unit of the consumption
good if aggregate shock in the next period is zt+1, irrespective of the idiosyncratic shock yt+1. Its
25Alternatively, we could have agents simply trade in the bond and adjust the net supply of bonds to account for
the positive capital income α in the aggregate. We only introduce both assets into the Bewley economy to make
the mapping to allocations in the Arrow and THL models simpler.
26See Chapter 17 of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) for the standard formal deﬁnition and the straightforward
algorithm to compute such a stationary equilibrium.
23price today is given by qt(zt,zt+1). In addition, households trade shares in the Lucas tree. We use
σt(st) to denote the number of shares a household with history st = (yt,zt) purchases today and
we let vt(zt) denote the price of one share.
An agent starting period t with initial wealth θt(st) buys consumption commodities in the spot











If next period’s state is st+1 = (st,yt+1,zt+1), her wealth is given by her labor income, the payoﬀ
from the contingent claim purchased in the previous period as well as the value of her position on
the stock, including dividends:
θt+1(s








In addition to the budget constraints, the households’ trading strategies are subject to solvency
constraints of one of two types. The ﬁrst type of constraint imposes a lower bound on the value of


















t,zt+1) for all zt+1. (14)
We assume these solvency constraints are at least tight enough to prevent Ponzi schemes. In
addition, we impose restrictions on the solvency constraints that make them proportional to the
aggregate endowment in the economy:
Condition 4.4. We assume that the borrowing constraints only depend on the aggregate history
through the level of the aggregate endowment. That is, we assume that:
Kt(y
t,z






t,zt+1) = ˆ Mt(y
t)et+1(z
t+1).
If the constraints did not have this feature in a stochastically growing economy, the constraints
24would become more or less binding as the economy grows, clearly not a desirable feature27. The
deﬁnition of an equilibrium is completely standard (see section A.1 of the Appendix).
Instead of working with the model with aggregate risk, we transform the Arrow model into a
stationary model. As we are about to show, the equilibrium allocations and prices in the de-trended
model are the same as the allocations and prices in a stationary Bewley equilibrium.
4.2.2 Equilibrium in the De-trended Arrow Model
We use hatted variables to denote the variables in the stationary model. Households rank con-
sumption shares {ˆ ct} in exactly the same way as original consumption streams {ct}. Dividing the


















where we have deﬁned the deﬂated Arrow positions as ˆ at(st,zt+1) =
at(st,zt+1)
et+1(zt+1) and prices as
ˆ qt(zt,zt+1) = qt(zt,zt+1)λ(zt+1). The deﬂated stock price is given by ˆ vt(zt) =
vt(zt)
et(zt). Similarly,

















t) for all zt+1. (17)
Finally, the goods market clearing condition is given by:




t)dΘ0 = 1. (18)
The conditional probabilities simplify due to condition (4.1). The asset market clearing conditions
are exactly the same as before. In the stationary model, the household maximizes ˆ U(ˆ c)(s0) by
choosing consumption, Arrow securities and shares of the Lucas tree, subject to the budget con-
straint (15) and the solvency constraint (16) or (17) in each node st. The deﬁnition of a competitive
equilibrium in the de-trended Arrow model is straightforward.
Deﬁnition 4.2. For initial aggregate state z0 and distribution Θ0 over (θ0,y0), a competitive equi-
librium for the de-trended Arrow model consists of trading strategies {ˆ at(θ0,st,zt+1)}, {ˆ σt(θ0,st)},
27In the incomplete markets literature the borrowing constraints usually satisfy this condition (see e.g. Heaton
and Lucas (1996)). It is easy to show that solvency constraints that are not too tight in the sense of Alvarez and
Jermann (2000) also satisfy this condition.
25{ˆ ct(θ0,st)} and prices {ˆ qt(zt,zt+1)}, {ˆ vt(zt)} such that
1. Given prices, trading strategies solve the household maximization problem
2. The goods market clears, that is, equation (18) holds for all zt.
3. The asset markets clear









t,zt+1)dΘ0 = 0 for all zt+1 ∈ Z
The ﬁrst order conditions and complementary slackness conditions, together with the appro-
priate transversality condition, are listed in the appendix in section (A.1.1). These are necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for optimality on the household side. Now we are ready to establish the
equivalence between equilibria in the Bewley model and in the Arrow model.
4.2.3 Equivalence Results
The equilibria in the Bewley model can be mapped into equilibria of the stochastically growing
Arrow model.
Theorem 4.1. An equilibrium of the Bewley model {ˆ ct(θ0,yt),ˆ at(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)} and { ˆ Rt,ˆ vt}
can be made into an equilibrium for the Arrow model with growth, {at(θ0,st,zt+1)}, {σt(θ0,st)},
{ct(θ0,st)} and {qt(zt,zt+1)}, {vt(zt)}, with
ct(θ0,s




t) = ˆ σt(θ0,y
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at(θ0,s




















The proof is given in the appendix, but here we provide its main intuition. Conjecture that the






26An unconstrained household’s Euler equation for the Arrow securities is given by (see section










But, in light of conditions (4.1) and (4.2) and given our conjecture that consumption allocations in
the de-trended Arrow model only depend on idiosyncratic shock histories yt and not on st = (yt,zt),

















where we used the conjectured form of prices in (20). This is exactly the Euler equation for bonds
in the Bewley model. Since Bewley equilibrium consumption allocations satisfy this condition,
they therefore satisfy the Euler equation in the de-trended Arrow model, if prices are of the form
(20). The proof in the appendix shows that a similar argument applies for the Euler equation with
respect to the stock (under the conjectured stock prices), and also shows that for agents whose
solvency constraints binds the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints in the Bewley equilibrium
are also valid Lagrange multipliers for the constraints in the de-trended Arrow model. This implies,
in particular, that our results go through regardless of how tight the solvency constraints are. Once
one has established that allocations and prices of a Bewley equilibrium are an equilibrium in the
de-trended Arrow model, one simply needs to scale up allocation and prices by the appropriate
growth factors to obtain the equilibrium prices and allocations in the stochastically growing Arrow
model, as stated in the theorem.
It is straightforward to compute risk-free interest rates for the Arrow model. By summing over
aggregate states tomorrow on both sides of equation (20), we ﬁnd that the risk-free rate in the







= ˆ Rt. (23)
Once we have determined risk free interest rates for the de-trended model, ˆ RA
t = ˆ Rt, we can back
out the implied interest rate for the original growing Arrow model, using (69) in the previous
theorem.28
28The dependence of ˆ RA
t on time t is not surprising since, for an arbitrary initial distribution of assets Θ0, we
27Corollary 4.1. If equilibrium risk-free interest rates in the de-trended Arrow model are given by











zt+1 φ(zt+1)λ(zt+1)−γ . (24)
The theorem implies that we can solve for an equilibrium in the Bewley model of section
4.1 (and, in particular, a stationary equilibrium), including risk free interest rates ˆ Rt, and we can
deduce the equilibrium allocations and prices for the Arrow model from those in the Bewley model,
using the mapping described in theorem 4.1. The key to this result is that households in the Bewley
model face exactly the same Euler equations as the households in the de-trended version of the
Arrow model.
This theorem has several important implications. First, we will use this equivalence result to
show below that asset prices in the Arrow model are identical to those in the representative agent
model, except for a lower risk-free interest rate (and a higher price/dividend ratio for stocks).29
Second, the existence proofs in the literature for stationary equilibria in the Bewley model directly
carry over to the stochastically growing model.30 Third, the moments of the wealth distribution
vary over time but proportionally to the aggregate endowment. If the initial wealth distribution
in the de-trended model corresponds to an invariant distribution in the Bewley model, then for
example the ratio of the mean to the standard deviation of the wealth distribution is constant
in the Arrow model with aggregate risk as well. Finally, an important result of the previous
theorem is that, in the Arrow equilibrium, the trade of Arrow securities is simply proportional to
the aggregate endowment: at(θ0,st,zt+1) = ˆ at(θ0,yt)et+1(zt+1), or, equivalently, in the de-trended
Arrow model households choose not to make their contingent claims purchases contingent on next
period’s aggregate shock: ˆ at(θ0,st,zt+1) = ˆ at(θ0,yt). Furthermore, since in the Bewley model
without loss of generality ˆ at(θ0,yt) = 0, we can focus on the situation where Arrow securities are
not traded at all: at(θ0,st,zt+1) = 0. This no-trade result for contingent claims suggests that our
equivalence result will carry over to environments with more limited asset structures. That is what
we show in the next section.
cannot expect the equilibrium to be stationary. In the same way we expect that ˆ vt(zt) is only a function of t as
well, but not of zt.
29The fact that the risk-free interest rate is lower comes directly from the fact that interest rates in the Bewley
model are lower than in the corresponding representative agent model without aggregate risk.
30See e.g. Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994) or Miao (2002) for (elements of) existence proofs. Uniqueness of a
stationary equilibrium is much harder to establish. Our equivalence result shows that for any stationary Bewley
equilibrium there exists a corresponding Arrow equilibrium in the model with aggregate risk. Furthermore note
that our result does not rule out other Arrow equilibria either.
284.3 The Bond Model
We now turn our attention to the main model of interest, namely the model with a stock and a
single one-period discount bond. This section establishes the equivalence of equilibria in the Bond
model and the Bewley model by showing that the optimality conditions in the de-trended Arrow
and the de-trended Bond model are identical. In addition, we show that in the benchmark case
with i.i.d. aggregate endowment growth shocks, agents do not even trade bonds in equilibrium.
4.3.1 Market Structure
In the Bond model, agents only trade a one-period discount bond and a stock. An agent who starts
period t with initial wealth composed of his stock holdings, bond and stock payouts, and labor
income, buys consumption commodities in the spot market and trades a one-period bond and the















Here, bt(st) denotes the amount of bonds purchased and Rt(zt) is the gross interest rate from
period t to t + 1. As was the case in the Arrow model, short-sales of the bond and the stock are
















t,zt+1) for all zt+1. (27)
Since bt(st) and σt(st) are chosen before zt+1 is realized, at most one of the constraints (27) will
be binding at a given time. The deﬁnition of an equilibrium for the Bond model follows directly.
(see section (A.2) in the appendix). We now show that the equilibria in the Arrow and the Bond
model coincide. As a corollary, it follows that the asset pricing implications of both models are
identical. In order to do so, we ﬁrst transform the model with growth into a stationary, de-trended
model.
294.3.2 Equilibrium in the De-trended Bond Model

















where we deﬁne the deﬂated bond position as ˆ bt(st) =
bt(st)
et(zt). Using condition (4.4), the solvency
















t) for all zt+1. (30)
The deﬁnition of equilibrium in the de-trended Bond model is straightforward and hence omitted.31
We now show that equilibrium consumption allocations in the de-trended Bond model coincide with
those of the Arrow model.
4.3.3 Equivalence Results
As for the Arrow model, we can show that the Bewley equilibrium allocations and prices constitute,
after appropriate scaling by endowment (growth) factors, an equilibrium of the Bond model with
growth.
Theorem 4.2. An equilibrium of a stationary Bewley model, given by trading strategies {ˆ ct(θ0,yt),ˆ at(θ0,yt),






and {Rt(zt)} and {vt(zt)} where
ct(θ0,s












t) = ˆ vtet(z
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and bond holdings given by bt(θ0,st) = 0.
The crucial step of the proof, given in the appendix, shows that Bewley allocations, given
31We list the ﬁrst order conditions for household optimality and the transversality conditions in section (A.2) of
the appendix.
30the prices proposed in the theorem, satisfy the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for household
optimality and all market clearing conditions in the de-trended Bond model.
This theorem again has several important consequences. First, equilibrium risk-free rates in
the Arrow and in the Bond model coincide, despite the fact that the set of assets agents can trade
to insure consumption risk diﬀers in the two models. Second, in equilibrium of the Bond model,
the bond market is inoperative: bt−1(st−1) = ˆ bt−1(st−1) = 0 for all st−1. Therefore all consumption
smoothing is done by trading stocks, and agents keep their net wealth proportional to the level of










t−1)[ˆ vt + α],
it is clear that bond holdings bt(yt−1) = 0 need to be zero for all yt−1, if all the consumption,
portfolio choices and prices, are independent of the aggregate history zt, simply because the bond
return in the deﬂated economy depends on the aggregate shock zt through λ(zt). This demonstrates
the irrelevance of the history of idiosyncratic shocks yt for portfolio choice. There is no link between
ﬁnancial wealth and the share of this wealth being held in equity.
In summary, our results show that one can solve for equilibria in a standard Bewley model
and then map this equilibrium into an equilibrium for both the Arrow model and the Bond model
with aggregate risk. The risk-free interest rate and the price of the Lucas tree are the same in the
stochastic Arrow and Bond models. Finally, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention
to equilibria in which bonds are not traded; consequently transaction costs in the bond market
would not change our results. Transaction costs in the stock market of course would (see section
(6)). In addition, this implies that our result is robust to the introduction of short-sale constraints
imposed on stocks and bonds separately, because agents choose not to trade bonds in equilibrium,
as long as these short-sale constraints are not tighter than the solvency constraints.
Finally, we brieﬂy show that the endowment economy we considered is isomorphic to a produc-
tion economy with a single input.
32There is a subtle diﬀerence between this result and the corresponding result for the Arrow model. In the Arrow
model we demonstrated that contingent claims positions were in fact uncontingent: ˆ at(θ0,st,zt+1) = ˆ at(θ0,yt) and
equal to the Bond position in the Bewley equilibrium, but not necessarily equal to zero. In the Bond model bond
positions have to be zero. But since bonds in the Bewley equilibrium are a redundant asset, one can restrict attention
to the situation where ˆ at(θ0,yt) = 0, although this is not necessary for our results.
314.4 Production Model






where et(zt) now denotes Total Factor Productivity, but evolves stochastically as before. Total
labor input is given by
Lt(z
t) =





where η(yt) is the idiosyncratic labor productivity shock; so far this was the idiosyncratic income
shock. Firms hire eﬃciency units of labor in a competitive labor market at a wage
wt(z
t) = (1 − α)Yt(z
t)/Lt(z
t)
Dividends that accrue to the holder of the shares in the company are given by:
dt(z
t) = (1 − α)Yt(z
t)




otherwise the household budget constraint remains unchanged. We assume that the period utility













This suggests that the entire aggregate shock will be absorbed by consumption, and labor supply
is only aﬀected by the idiosyncratic shock. We can apply the same detrending procedure as before,
and then solve the Bewley model with labor productivity shocks and endogenous labor supply.
Denote the resulting allocation in the Bewley model by a hat. The corresponding equilibrium
allocations in the growing economy satisfy: lt(st) = ˆ lt(yt), and thus Lt(zt) = ˆ Lt, where ˆ Lt is the
nonstochastic aggregate labor supply in the Bewley model. In addition, consumption and wages
33We thank xxx for useful discussions leading to this subsection.
32in the growing economy can be obtained as:
ct(s
t) = et(zt)ˆ ct(y
t)
wt(s
t) = et(zt) ˆ wt
and the mapping of assets between the Bewley model and the stochastically growing model is
exactly the same as before. Note that these allocations satisfy the intratemporal optimality condi-
tion (31). The other optimality conditions remain unchanged from the case with exogenous labor
supply.
Summary In both the Arrow and the Bond model, households do not have a motive for trading
bonds, unless there are tighter short-sale constraints on stocks than on bonds. We do not deal with
this case. In addition, the no-trade result depends critically on the i.i.d assumption for aggregate
shocks, as we will show in section (6). If the aggregate shocks are not i.i.d, agents want to hedge
against the implied shocks to interest rates. We will show in section (6) that these interest rate
shocks look like taste shocks in the de-trended model. But, ﬁrst, we compare the asset pricing
implications of the equilibria just described in the Arrow and the Bond models to those emerging
from the BL (standard representative agent) model.
5 Asset Pricing Implications
This section shows that the multiplicative risk premium on a claim to aggregate consumption in
the Bond model -and the Arrow model- equals the risk premium in the representative agent model.
Uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk only lowers the risk-free rate, because the ratio of any two
equilibrium state prices is the same as in the representative agent BL economy, exactly as in the
two-period example.
5.1 Consumption-CAPM
The benchmark model of consumption-based asset pricing is the representative agent BL model.
The representative agent owns a claim to the aggregate ‘labor’ income stream {(1 − α)et(zt)} and
she can trade a stock (a claim to the dividends αet(zt) of the Lucas tree), a bond and a complete
set of Arrow securities.34
First, we show that the Breeden-Lucas Consumption-CAPM also prices excess returns on the
stock in the Bond model and the Arrow model. Let Rs denote the return on a claim to aggregate
consumption. We have
34See separate appendix available on-line for a complete description.
33Lemma 5.1. The BL Consumption-CAPM prices excess returns in the Arrow model and the Bond










The appendix shows that this result follows directly from subtracting the Euler equations for
the bond from that for the stock in both models. This result has important implications for
empirical work in asset pricing. First, and conditional on either the Arrow model or the Bond
model being the correct model of the economy, despite the existence of market incompleteness
and binding solvency constraints, an econometrician can estimate the coeﬃcient of risk aversion
(or the intertemporal elasticity of substitution) directly from aggregate consumption data and the
excess return on stocks, as in Hansen and Singleton (1983). Second, the result provides a strong
justiﬁcation for explaining the cross-section of excess returns, when using the CCAPM, without
trying to match the risk-free rate. The implications of the BL, the Arrow and the Bond model are
the same with respect to excess returns, while not with respect to the risk-free rate.
5.2 Risk Premia
We now show that, perhaps not surprisingly in light of the previous result, the equilibrium risk
premium in the Arrow and the Bond model is identical to the one in the representative agent
model.35 While the risk-free rate is higher in the representative agent model than in the Arrow
and Bond model, and consequently the price of the stock is correspondingly lower, the multiplicative
risk premium is the same in all three models and it is constant across states of the world.
In order to demonstrate our main result we ﬁrst show that the stochastic discount factors that
price stochastic payoﬀs in the representative agent model and the Arrow (and thus the Bond)
model only diﬀer by a non-random multiplicative term, equal to the ratio of (growth-deﬂated)
risk-free interest rates in the two models. In what follows we use the superscript RE to denote
equilibrium variables in the representative agent model.
Proposition 5.1. The equilibrium stochastic discount factor in the Arrow and the Bond model
given by mA
t+1 = mRE
t+1κt where the non-random multiplicative term is given κt =
ˆ Rt
RE
ˆ Rt ≥ 1, and
mRE
t+1 is the stochastic discount factor in the representative agent model.
κt is straightforward to compute, because it only involves the equilibrium risk-free interest
rates from the stationary version of the representative agent model, ˆ Rt
RE
, and the equilibrium
interest rates from the Bewley model, ˆ Rt. Luttmer (1991) and Cochrane and Hansen (1992) had
already established a similar aggregation result for the case in which households face market wealth
35Note that this does not immediately follow from the result in Lemma 5.1.
34constraints, but in a complete markets environment. We show that their result survives even if
households trade only a stock and a bond.
The proof that risk premia are identical in the representative agent model and the Arrow as
well as the Bond model follows directly from the previous decomposition of the stochastic discount
factor.36 Let Rt,j [{dt+k}] denote the j-period holding return on a claim to the endowment stream
{dt+k}
∞
k=0 at time t. Consequently Rt,1 [1] is the gross risk-free rate and Rt,1 [αet+k] is the one-period
holding return on a k-period strip of the aggregate endowment (a claim to α times the aggregate
endowment k periods from now). Thus Rt,1 [{αet+k}] is the one period holding return on an asset
(such as a stock) that pays α times the aggregate endowment in all future periods. Finally, we
deﬁne the multiplicative risk premium as the ratio of the expected return on stocks and the risk-free
rate:1 + νt =
EtRt,1[{αet+k}]
Rt,1[1] . With this notation in place, we can state now our main result.
Theorem 5.1. The multiplicative risk premium in the Arrow model and Bond model equals that
in the representative agent model 1 + νA
t = 1 + νB
t = 1 + νRE
t , and is constant across states of the
world.
Thus, the extent to which households smooth idiosyncratic income shocks in the Arrow model
or in the Bond model has absolutely no eﬀect on the size of risk premia; it merely lowers the risk-
free rate. Market incompleteness does not generate any dynamics in the conditional risk premia
either: the conditional risk premium is constant.
6 Extensions of the General Results
In section 6.1, we investigate how robust our results are to the assumption that aggregate shocks
are i.i.d over time, which implies that the growth rate of the aggregate endowment is i.i.d over
time. In section 6.2, we show that our results go through in the case of permanent idiosyncratic
shocks. These extensions are important, especially because the two-period model does not allow
us to analyze these cases. Section (6.3) shows that the results we derived in the case of cyclical
capital shares still hold in the inﬁnite horizon economy.
The intuition that we built in the two-period example applies here too. In all of these cases, the
irrelevance result goes through if households can manage to keep their consumption proportional
to aggregate consumption (i.e. keep their consumption shares independent of aggregate shocks)
by trading the limited menu of available securities.
36The proof strategy follows Alvarez and Jermann (2001) who derive a similar result in the context of a complete
markets model populated by two agents that face endogenous solvency constraints.
356.1 Non-iid Aggregate Shocks
Assume that the aggregate shock z follows a ﬁrst order Markov chain characterized by the transition
matrix φ(z′|z) > 0. So far we studied the special case in which φ(z′|z) = φ(z′). Recall that the












Thus if φ is serially correlated, ˆ φ is too, and the discount factor ˆ β depends on the current
aggregate state of the world. In the de-trended model, aggregate endowment shocks act as a
common taste shock that renders all households more or less impatient. Since this shock aﬀects
all households in the same way, they will not able to insure against it. As a result, this shock
aﬀects the price/dividend ratio and the interest rate, but it leaves the risk premium unaltered. In
contrast to our previous results, however, now there is trade in Arrow securities in equilibrium, so
the equivalence between equilibria in the Arrow and the Bond model breaks down.
6.1.1 Stationary Bewley Model
We adhere to the same strategy, and we show that the equilibrium allocations and prices from a
stationary version of the model, the Bewley model can be implemented, after appropriate scaling by
the aggregate endowment, as equilibria in the stochastically growing model. Since the time discount
factors are subject to aggregate shock, we ﬁrst have to choose an appropriate nonstochastic time
discount factor for this Bewley model. We choose a sequence of non-random time discount factors
that assures that Bewley equilibrium allocations satisfy the time zero budget constraint in the
model with aggregate shocks when the initial wealth distribution Θ0 in the two models coincide.
Let
ˆ β0,τ(z
τ|z0) = ˆ β(z0)ˆ β(z1)... ˆ β(zτ)
denote the time discount factor between period 0 and period τ + 1, given by the product of one-
period time discount factors. We deﬁne the average (across aggregate shocks) time discount factor
between period 0 and t as:





t−1|z0),t ≥ 1, (32)
where   φ(zt−1|z0) is the probability distribution over zt−1 induced by φ(z′|z). If aggregate shocks
are i.i.d, then we have that   βt = ˆ βt, as before. Since z0 is a ﬁxed initial condition, we chose not to
index   βt by z0 to make sure it is understood that   βt is nonstochastic.
In order to construct equilibrium allocations in the stochastically growing model, we will show






can be implemented as equilibrium allocations and interest rates for
the actual Arrow model with stochastic discount factors. The crucial adjustment in this mapping
is to rescale the risk-free interest rate in proportion to the taste shock ˆ β(z).
To understand the eﬀect of these aggregate taste shocks on the time discount rate to be used
in the Bewley model, we use a simple example
Example 6.1. Suppose that ˆ β(z) = e−ˆ ρ(z) is lognormal and i.i.d, where ˆ ρ(z) has mean ˆ ρ variance
σ2. Deﬁne the average t-period time discount rate   ρt by   βt = e−  ρt. Then the average one-period
discount rate used in the Bewley model is given by:
  ρt
t




2 for any t ≥ 1
Thus the presence of taste shocks (σ2 > 0) in the de-trended Arrow model induces a discount rate
  ρ to be used in the Bewley model that is lower than the mean discount rate ˆ ρ because of the risk
associated with the taste shocks.
This example suggests that these taste shocks lower the risk-free interest rates compared to
those in model without taste shocks (which originate from aggregate endowment shocks in the
stochastically growing model).









risk-free rate has to equal the stock return in each period, to rule out arbitrage:
ˆ Rt =
ˆ v+1 + α
ˆ vt
.
Only the total wealth positions in the Bewley model are uniquely pinned down. Without loss of
generality, we focus on the case where ˆ at(θ0,yt) = 0 for all yt. We now argue that the allocation
{ˆ ct(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)} can be made into an Arrow equilibrium, and in the process show why we
need to choose the speciﬁc discount factor sequence in (32) for the Bewley model. We need some










denotes the Bewley equilibrium price of one unit of consumption to be delivered at time τ, in terms
of consumption at time t. By convention ˜ Qτ = ˜ Q0,τ and ˜ Qτ,τ = 1 for all τ. ˆ Rt,τ is the gross risk-free
interest rate between period t and τ in the Bewley equilibrium.
376.1.2 Arrow Model
In contrast to the Bewley model, the de-trended Arrow model features aggregate shocks to the
time discount factor ˆ β. These need to be reﬂected in prices. We therefore propose state-dependent
equilibrium prices for the de-trended Arrow model, then we show that the Bewley equilibrium
allocations, in turn, satisfy the Euler equations when evaluated at these prices, and they also
satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint in the de-trended Arrow model. This implies that,
absent binding solvency constraints, the Bewley equilibrium can be made into an equilibrium of
the de-trended Arrow model, and thus, after the appropriate scaling, into an equilibrium of the
original Arrow model. Finally, we discuss potentially binding solvency constraints and the Bond
model.
We conjecture that the Arrow-Debreu prices in the deﬂated Arrow model are given by
ˆ Qt(z







  βt ˆ R0,t
, (34)
where ˜ Qt was deﬁned above as the time 0 price of consumption in period t in the Bewley model.










= ˆ qt(zt+1|zt), (35)




  R0,t+1. Arrow prices are Markovian in zt, since ˆ Rt and (  βt,   βt+1)







ˆ qt(zt+1|zt) = ˆ Rt
  βt+1
ˆ β(zt)  βt
. (36)
Interest rates now depend on the current aggregate state of the world zt. Finally, we also conjecture
that the stock price in the de-trended Arrow model satisﬁes:
ˆ vt(z










Armed with these conjectured prices we can now prove the following result.
Lemma 6.1. Absent solvency constraints, the household Euler equations are satisﬁed in the Arrow
model at the Bewley allocations {ˆ ct+1(yt,yt+1)} and Arrow prices {ˆ qt(zt+1|zt)} given by (35).
38Trading Next, we spell out which asset trades support the Bewley equilibrium consumption al-
locations in the de-trended Arrow model, and we show that the implied contingent claims positions
clear the market for Arrow securities.
At any point in time and any node of the event tree, the position of Arrow securities at the
beginning of the period, plus the value of the stock position cum dividends, has to ﬁnance the
value of excess demand from today into the inﬁnite future. Thus, the Arrow securities position
implied by the Bewley equilibrium allocation {ˆ ct(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)} is given by:37
ˆ at−1(θ0,y
t−1,z
t) = ˆ ct(θ0,y









τ) − (1 − α)η(yτ))
−ˆ σt−1(θ0,y
t−1)[ˆ vt(zt) + α]. (38)
Proposition 6.1. The contingent claims positions implied by the Bewley allocations in (38) clear
the Arrow securities markets, that is





t)dΘ0 = 0 for all z
t.
Since the wealth from stock holdings at the beginning of the period
ˆ σt−1(θ0,y





has to ﬁnance future excess consumption demand in the Bewley equilibrium, we can state the
























τ|zt) −   Qt,τ
 
The Arrow securities positions held by households are used to hedge against the interest rate shocks
that govern the diﬀerence between the stochastic ˆ Qτ(zτ|zt) and the deterministic   Qt,τ. If aggregate
endowment growth is i.i.d, there are no taste shocks in the detrended Arrow model, and from (36)
we see that the interest rates are deterministic. The gap between ˆ Qτ(zτ|zt) and   Qt,τ is zero and
no Arrow securities are traded in equilibrium, conﬁrming the results in section 4.2.
In order to close our argument, we need to show that no initial wealth transfers between
individuals are required for this implementation. In other words, the initial Arrow securities
37We will verify below that the price of the stock in the de-trended Arrow model satisﬁes ˆ vt(zt) = ˆ vt(zt).
39position ˆ a−1(θ0,y−1,z0) implied by (38) at time 0, is zero for all households.38
To do so we proceed in two steps. First, we show that the average time zero state prices in
the Arrow model coincide with the state prices in the Bewley model. For this result to hold our




for the Bewley model is crucial.
Lemma 6.2. The conjectured prices for the Arrow model in (34) and the prices in the Bewley
model deﬁned in (33) satisfy  
zτ
ˆ Qτ(z
τ|z0) = ˜ Qτ
Finally, using this result we can establish that no wealth transfers are necessary to implement
the Bewley equilibrium as equilibrium in the de-trended Arrow model.
Lemma 6.3. The Arrow securities position at time 0 given in (38) is zero:
ˆ a−1(θ0,y
−1,z0) = 0.
Having established that the Bewley equilibrium is an equilibrium for the de-trended Arrow
model with the same initial wealth distribution Θ0, the following theorem obviously results.
Theorem 6.2. An equilibrium of the Bewley model {ˆ ct(θ0,yt), ˆ σt(θ0,yt)} and { ˆ Rt,ˆ vt} where house-




can be made into an equilibrium for the Arrow
model with growth, {at(θ0,st,zt+1)}, {σt(θ0,st)}, {ct(θ0,st)} and {qt(zt,zt+1)}, {vt(zt)}, with
ct(θ0,s




t) = ˆ σt(θ0,y
t)
at(θ0,s
t,zt+1) = ˆ at(θ0,y
t,zt+1)et+1(z
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Risk Premia Of course, this implies that our baseline irrelevance result for risk premia survives
the introduction of non-i.i.d. aggregate shocks, provided that a complete menu of aggregate-
38Without this argument we merely would have shown that a Bewley equilibrium for initial condition Θ0 can be
implemented as equilibrium of the de-trended Arrow model with initial conditions z0 and some initial distribution
of wealth, but not necessarily Θ0.
40state-contingent securities is traded.39 These aggregate taste shocks only aﬀect interest rates
and price/dividend ratios, not risk premia. When agents in the transformed model become more
impatient, the interest rises and the price/dividend ratio decreases, but the conditional expected
excess return is unchanged.
Solvency Constraints So far, we have abstracted from binding solvency constraints. Previ-
ously, we assumed that the solvency constraints satisfy Kt(st) = ˆ Kt(yt)et(zt) and Mt+1(st+1) =
ˆ Mt(yt)et(zt+1). The allocations computed in the stationary model using ˆ Kt(yt) and ˆ Mt(yt) as sol-
vency constraints, satisfy a modiﬁed version of the solvency constraints Kt(st) and Mt+1(st+1).





























where ˆ vt is the (deterministic) Bewley equilibrium stock price.
If the allocations satisfy the constraints in the stationary Bewley model, they satisfy the mod-
iﬁed solvency constraints in the actual Arrow model, but not the ones we originally speciﬁed,
because of the nonzero state-contingent claims positions.40 Nevertheless, in principle, one could
reverse-engineer a sequence of auxiliary solvency constraints such that in the actual equilibrium
the modiﬁed version of the auxiliary constraints coincides with the actual constraints we want to
impose, Kt(st).
6.1.3 Bond Model
Finally, in the Bond model, our previous equivalence result no longer holds, since with predictability
in aggregate consumption growth households trade state-contingent claims in the equilibrium of
the Arrow model. Unless the aggregate shock can only take two values, the market structure of
the Bond model prevents them from doing so, and thus our implementation and irrelevance results










ˆ Rt  βt+1
= κt
is still deterministic, and thus the proofs of section 5 go through unchanged.
40Note that these violations of the original constraints are completely due to the impact of interest rate shocks
on the value of the asset portfolio.
416.2 Permanent Idiosyncratic Shocks
Our results do not hinge on mean reversion in household income. In fact, we can also consider
a version of our model with permanent idiosyncratic income shocks. In this economy, household
income in logs follows a random walk:
logηt = logηt−1 + yt. (41)
where yt ∼ N(−1
2σ2
y,σ2
y) is normally distributed and independent over time and across households.
Also, we assume that η−1 = 1 for all households. This implies that the level of household labor









and thus at any time t we know that E (ηt(yt)) = 1, where E is the expectation at time 0 for a single
household. By the law of large numbers this expression is also equal to the cross-sectional expec-
tation. As before, the stock pays a fraction α of the aggregate endowment et(zt) as dividends and
the shares are in constant unit supply. In this environment, our aggregation and irrelevance result
survives, under the same assumptions as in the paper. This follows because the implementation in
the proof we provided above does not rely on mean reversion in labor income at all.41
In addition, one can show that in the case of permanent shocks as modeled above, an autarkic
equilibrium in which agents do not trade and simply consume their labor income and dividends
exists if and only if α = 0, that is, if all assets are in zero net supply. Therefore, even in the
case of permanent shocks, equilibria in our environment need to feature trade in ﬁnancial markets,
unless α = 0. How does this result relate to the autarchy equilibrium in CD? To generate such an
equilibrium with α > 0 they reverse-engineer the aggregate dividend process and the household
labor income process. The resulting labor income process depends on the aggregate dividend
process and it is not consistent with the standard random walk speciﬁcation in equation (41).42
Finally, we conclude by describing the extension of our irrelevance result to an environment with
a counter-cyclical labor income share. It turns out that the results we derived in the two-period
economy carry over.
41Of course, in the case of permanent shocks the existence of (stationary) equilibrium in the Bewley model
becomes an issue. This problem can be circumvented by assuming that households die at an exponential rate, as in
Yaari (1965).
42As explained by CD, their speciﬁcation of the household labor income process is not empirically motivated (see
bottom of page 228); the sole focus is tractability. Their household income process in logs features some mean
reversion whose magnitude depends on the size of aggregate dividend payments.
426.3 Counter-cyclical aggregate labor income share
The relevant question is whether households can keep their own consumption in line with the
aggregate endowment in spite of the cyclical variation in the aggregate labor and capital income
share by taking positions in the contingent bond markets. If they can do so, then the variation in
the aggregate labor income share will have no bearing on allocations and prices. The intuition that
we derived in the two-period economy extends to the inﬁnite horizon economy: In the standard
multiplicative case (η(y,z) = η(y)(1−α(z))), the Bewley equilibrium that we have derived cannot
be implemented in the de-trended Arrow economy, because the required contingent bond payoﬀ
depends on the idiosyncratic shock realization yt+1 at t + 1:
at(θ0,s
t,yt+1,zt+1) = ˆ at(θ0,y
t)et+1(z
t+1) − (α − α(zt+1))η(yt+1) + ˆ σt(θ0,y
t)(α − α(zt+1)).
Hence, the irrelevance result breaks down. To replicate the payoﬀs of a claim to aggregate con-
sumption, households need to issue bonds with payoﬀs that are contingent on the idiosyncratic
shocks. However, if we assume that the household’s labor income as a share of the aggregate
endowment is given by the standard component η(y), which depends only on the realization of the
idiosyncratic event y and a second component which depends on the realization of the aggregate
shock z:
η(y,z) = α − α(z) + (1 − α)η(y),
then the required contingent bond payoﬀ does not depend on the idiosyncratic shock yt+1 at t+1:
at(θ0,s
t,zt+1) = ˆ at(θ0,y
t)et+1(z
t+1) − (α − α(zt+1)) + ˆ σt(θ0,y
t)(α − α(zt+1)).
Households with more than average ﬁnancial wealths short contingent consumption claims for
expansions and go long in contingent consumption claims for expansions. Households with ﬁnancial
wealth below the average do the opposite. Section C.2 in the separate appendix spells out the
details. This means that we have implemented the same Bewley equilibrium in the de-trended
Arrow economy with stochastic capital shares. Of course, the implementation of the Bewley
equilibrium now requires trade in the contingent claim markets. The irrelevance result breaks down
in the Bond economy, except in the case with only two aggregate states. This is not surprising.
In the standard multiplicative case, the cross sectional distribution of the (demeaned) household
income shares is not independent of aggregate shocks, whereas in the additive case it is. And our
results go through in the additive case, but not in the multiplicative case. Essentially, in the
multiplicative case, a large labor share (small α(zt)) increases the variance of the idiosyncratic
shocks, exactly like CCV.
437 Conclusion
We have derived conditions under which the history of a household’s idiosyncratic shocks has no
eﬀect on his portfolio choice, even in the presence of binding solvency constraints. This portfolio
irrelevance result directly implies the risk premium irrelevance result. Since all households bear
the same amount of aggregate risk in equilibrium, the history of aggregate shocks does not af-
fect equilibrium prices and allocations. The equilibrium risk-free rate, the risk premium and the
price/dividend ratio are all deterministic, at least in the benchmark model without predictability in
aggregate consumption growth. However, only a weaker version of this irrelevance result survives
in economies with a predictable component in aggregate consumption growth (see e.g. Bansal and
Yaron (2004)), because this component creates heterogeneous hedging demands that do depend on
the household’s history of idiosyncratic shocks. This deserves to be explored further.
Other than predictability in aggregate consumption growth shocks, there are two main ways
around our results. One approach is to concentrate aggregate risk by forcing some households out of
the stock market altogether. This is the approach adopted in the literature on limited participation
(see e.g. Guvenen (2003), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Gomes and Michaelides (2008), Chien, Cole,
and Lustig (2009) and Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002)). The second approach consists of
concentrating labor income risk in recessions. Recently Krusell and Smith (1997) and Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2007) have argued that models with idiosyncratic income shocks and incomplete
markets can generate an equity premium that is substantially larger than the CCAPM if there is
counter-cyclical cross-sectional variance (CCV) in labor income shocks. Storesletten, Telmer and
Yaron (2004) argue that this condition is satisﬁed in the data, although it is not clear the CCV in
the data is strong enough to explain equity risk premia at reasonable levels of risk aversion. Our
paper demonstrates analytically that CCV in labor income or limited stock market participation
is not only suﬃcient, but necessary to make uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks potentially
useful for explaining the equity premium, even in the presence of binding solvency constraints.
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48A Additional Deﬁnitions
A.1 Arrow Model
The deﬁnition of an equilibrium in the Arrow model is standard. Each household is assigned a label that
consists of its initial ﬁnancial wealth θ0 and its initial state s0 = (y0,z0). A household of type (θ0,s0)








and shares {σt(θ0,st)} to maximize her expected utility (1), subject to the budget constraints (11) and
subject to solvency constraints (13) or (14).
Deﬁnition A.1. For initial aggregate state z0 and distribution Θ0 over (θ0,y0), a competitive equilibrium








and prices  
qt(zt,zt+1)
 
, {vt(zt)} such that
1. Given prices, household allocations solve the household maximization problem
2. The goods market clears for all zt,





3. The asset markets clear for all zt









at(θ0,st,zt+1)dΘ0 = 0 for all zt+1 ∈ Z
A.1.1 Optimality Conditions for De-trended Arrow Model
Deﬁne the Lagrange multiplier
ˆ β(st)ˆ π(st|s0)u′(ˆ ct(st))ˆ µ(st) ≥ 0
for the constraint in (16) and
ˆ β(st)ˆ π(st|s0)u′(ˆ ct(st))ˆ κt(st,zt+1) ≥ 0
































49Only one of the two Lagrange multipliers enters the equations, depending on which version of the solvency












ˆ at(st,zt+1) + ˆ σt(st)
 

































ˆ β(st−1)ˆ π(st|s0)u′(ˆ ct(st))
 
ˆ σt(st)ˆ vt(zt) − ˆ Kt(yt)
 
= 0.
Since the household optimization has a concave objective function and a convex constraint set the ﬁrst
order conditions and complementary slackness conditions, together with the transversality condition, are
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for optimality of household allocation choices.
A.2 Bond Model
Agents only trade a single bond a single stock. Wealth tomorrow in state st+1 = (st,yt+1,zt+1) is given
by





Deﬁnition A.2. For an initial aggregate state z0 and distribution Θ0 over (θ0,y0), a competitive equi-






















1. Given prices, allocations solve the household maximization problem.
2. The goods market clears for all zt:





503. The asset markets clear for all zt:










A.2.1 Optimality Conditions for Bond Model
Deﬁne the Lagrange multiplier
ˆ β(st)ˆ π(st|s0)u′(ˆ ct(st))ˆ µ(st) ≥ 0
for the constraint in (29) and
ˆ β(st)ˆ π(st|s0)u′(ˆ ct(st))ˆ κt(st,zt+1) ≥ 0
for the constraint in (30). In the detrended Bond model the Euler equations read as



























































































ˆ β(st−1)ˆ π(st|s0)u′(ˆ ct(st))
 




• Proof of Proposition 3.1:
Proof. We brieﬂy derive this result. We can construct an equilibrium in the two period-economy
from the household’s ﬁrst order conditions. These are necessary and suﬃcient. We use λ0(s0) and
λ1(s1) to denote the Lagrangian multipliers on the budget constraints at time 0 and time 1. The
ﬁrst order conditions are given by the ﬁrst order condition for consumption at time 0, at time 1,
and for contingent bond purchases in each aggregate state of the world:
λ0(s0) = u′(c0(s0))
λ1(s1) = u′(c1(s1))βπ(y1|y0)φ(z1|z0)














By combining these conditions, we obtain the following expression for the contingent bond prices
and for the stock price:


















Finally, given that we have no initial heterogeneity, all households choose the same asset allocation
in period zero, and so we get zero bond holdings, identical stock holdings, and each household
consumes the aggregate endowment in period zero, while they consume the labor endowment plus




c1(s1) ≡ [(1 − α(z1))η(y1,z1) + α(z1)]e1(z1).
Inserting this into the asset prices for Arrow securities yields the following expression for the Arrow











m([(1 − α(z1))η(y1,z1) + α(z1)]λ(z1)e0(z0),e0(z0))
Hence, there is no equilibrium trade in securities markets in this simple two-period economy.
• Proof of Proposition 4.1:
We use U(c)(st) to denote the continuation utility of an agent from consumption stream c, starting
at history st. This continuation utility follows the simple recursion




where it is understood that (st,st+1) = (zt,zt+1,yt,yt+1). Divide both sides by et(st)1−γ to obtain
U(c)(st)








Deﬁne a new continuation utility index ˆ U(·) as follows:




ˆ U(ˆ c)(st) = u(ˆ ct(st)) + β
 
st+1
π(st+1|st)λ(zt+1)1−γ ˆ U(ˆ c)(st,st+1).
= u(ˆ ct(st)) + ˆ β(st)
 
st+1
ˆ π(st+1|st)ˆ U(ˆ c)(st,st+1).
Thus it follows, for two consumption streams c and c′, that
U(c)(st) ≥ U(c′)(st) if and only if ˆ U(ˆ c)(st) ≥ ˆ U(ˆ c′)(st),
i.e., the household orders original and growth-deﬂated consumption streams in exactly the same
way.
• Proof of Theorem 4.1:
53The proof consists of two parts. In a ﬁrst step, we argue that the Bewley equilibrium allocations
and prices can be transformed into an equilibrium for the de-trended Arrow model, and in a second
step, we argue that by scaling the allocations and prices by the appropriate endowment (growth)
factors, we obtain an equilibrium of the stochastically growing Arrow model.
Step 1: Take allocations and prices from a Bewley equilibrium,
 
ˆ ct(yt),ˆ at(yt), ˆ σt(yt)
 
,{ ˆ Rt, ˆ vt} and
let the associated Lagrange multipliers on the solvency constraints be given by
ˆ βtϕ(yt|y0)u′(ˆ ct(yt))ˆ µ(yt) ≥ 0,
for the constraint in (9) and
ˆ βtϕ(yt|y0)u′(ˆ ct(yt))ˆ κt(yt) ≥ 0,
for the constraint in (10). The ﬁrst order conditions (which are necessary and suﬃcient for household
optimal choices together with the complementary slackness and transversality conditions) in the
Bewley model, once combined to the Euler equations, are given by:






+ ˆ µt(yt) + ˆ Rtˆ κt(yt). (46)
= ˆ β
 
ˆ vt+1 + α
ˆ vt





+ ˆ µt(yt) +
 




The corresponding Euler equations for the de-trended Arrow model, evaluated at the Bewley equi-
































Evaluated at the conjectured prices,





and using the independence and i.i.d. assumptions, which imply
ˆ π(st+1|st) = ϕ(yt+1|yt)ˆ φ(zt+1)
ˆ β(st) = ˆ β
54these Euler equations can be restated as follows:
1 =







+ ˆ µt(yt) + ˆ Rtˆ κt(yt). (50)














+ˆ µt(yt) + ˆ κt(yt)
 





which are, given that
 
zt+1
ˆ φ(zt+1) = 1, exactly the Euler conditions (46) and (47) of the Bewley
model and hence satisﬁed by the Bewley equilibrium allocations. A similar argument applies to the










ˆ at(yt) + ˆ σt(yt)(ˆ vt+1 + α) − ˆ Mt(yt)
 
= 0, (53)

















ˆ at(yt) + ˆ σt(yt)[ˆ vt+1 + α] − ˆ Mt(yt)
 
= 0/ˆ φ(zt+1).
Again, the Bewley equilibrium allocations satisfy the complementary slackness conditions in the de-
trended Arrow model. The argument is exactly identical for the transversality conditions. Finally,
we have to check whether the Bewley equilibrium allocation satisﬁes the de-trended Arrow budget






ˆ φ(zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)ˆ vt ≤ η(yt) + ˆ at−1(yt−1) + σt−1(yt−1)[ˆ vt + α], (54)
which is exactly the budget constraint in the Bewley model. Thus, given the conjectured prices,
the Bewley equilibrium allocations are optimal in the de-trended Arrow model.
Since the market clearing conditions for assets and consumption goods coincide in the two models,
Bewley allocations satisfy the market clearing conditions in the de-trended Arrow model. Thus
we conclude that the Bewley equilibrium allocations, together with prices (48) and (49) are an
equilibrium in the de-trended Arrow model.
Step 2: Now, we need to show that an equilibrium of the de-trended Arrow model is, after appropri-
ate scaling, an equilibrium in the stochastically growing model, but this was established in section
4.2.2, in which we showed that by with the transformations ˆ ct(st) =
ct(st)
et(zt), ˆ at(st,zt+1) =
at(st,zt+1)
et+1(zt+1),
ˆ σt(st) = σt(st), ˆ qt(zt,zt+1) = qt(zt,zt+1)λ(zt+1), ˆ vt(zt) =
vt(zt)
et(zt) household problems and market
clearing conditions in the de-trended and the stochastically growing Arrow model coincide.
55• Proof of Theorem 4.2:
As in the Arrow model, the crucial part of the proof is to argue that Bewley equilibrium allocations
and prices can be made into an equilibrium for the de-trended Bond model. The Euler equations
of the Bewley model where given in (46) and (47).
The corresponding Euler equations for the de-trended Bond model, evaluated at the Bewley equi-
librium allocations and Lagrange multipliers ˆ µ(yt) and ˆ κt(yt)ˆ φ(zt+1), read as (see (44) and (45))






































Using the conjectured prices, we note that
ˆ vt(zt) = ˆ vt.





Now we use the independence and i.i.d. assumptions, which imply
ˆ π(st+1|st) = ϕ(yt+1|yt)ˆ φ(zt+1)
ˆ β(st) = ˆ β.










zt+1 φ(zt+1)λ(zt+1)1−γ = ˆ Rt
and thus the Euler equations can be restated as:






+ ˆ µ(yt) + ˆ κt(yt) ˆ Rt. (55)













+ˆ µ(yt) + ˆ κt(yt)
 
ˆ vt+1 + α
ˆ vt
   
zt+1
ˆ φ(zt+1),
which again are, given that
 
zt+1
ˆ φ(zt+1) = 1, exactly the Euler conditions (46) and (47) of the
Bewley model and hence satisﬁed by the Bewley equilibrium allocations. For the Bewley model,
the complementary slackness conditions were given in (52) and (53), and for the de-trended Bond
56model, evaluated at the proposed allocations in the theorem (which had bond holdings equal to









[ˆ vt+1 + α]
+ ˆ σt(yt)
 


















[ˆ vt+1 + α]
+ ˆ σt(yt)
 




ˆ at(yt) + ˆ σt(yt)[ˆ vt+1 + α] − ˆ Mt(yt)
 
= 0/ˆ φ(zt+1),
where we use the fact that the Bewley equilibrium prices and interest rates satisfy
ˆ Rt =
ˆ vt+1 + α
ˆ vt
.
These complementary slackness conditions are satisﬁed since the Bewley equilibrium allocations
satisfy the complementary slackness conditions in the Bewley model. The argument is exactly
identical for the transversality conditions. Finally, we have to check whether the allocations proposed
in the theorem satisfy the de-trended Bond model budget constraints. Plugging these into the de-













[ˆ vt+1 + α]
+ ˆ σt(yt)
 
ˆ vt ≤ (1 − α)η(yt) +
 
ˆ at−1(yt−1)
[ˆ vt + α]
+ ˆ σt−1(yt−1)
 




+ ˆ σt(yt)ˆ vt ≤ (1 − α)η(yt) + ˆ at−1(yt−1) + ˆ σt−1(yt−1)[ˆ vt + α],
which is exactly the budget constraint in the Bewley model. Thus, given the conjectured prices the
allocations proposed in the theorem are optimal household choices in the de-trended Bond model.
Equation (57) shows why, in contrast to the Arrow model, in the Bond model bond positions
have to be zero. Nothing in this equation depends in the aggregate shock zt except for the term
ˆ bt−1(yt−1)
λ(zt) . Therefore the budget constraint can only be satisﬁed if ˆ bt−1(yt−1) = 0. In the model with
growth, households want to keep wealth at the beginning of the period proportional to the aggregate
endowment in the economy, but, since bond positions are chosen in the previous period, and thus
cannot depend on the realization of the aggregate shock today, bond positions have to be zero to
achieve proportionally of wealth and the aggregate endowment. The market clearing conditions
for bonds in the de-trended Bond model is trivially satisﬁed because bond positions are identically
equal to zero. The goods market clearing condition is identical to that of the Bewley model and
thus satisﬁed by the Bewley equilibrium consumption allocations. It remains to be shown that the
57stock market clears. We know that:
















[ˆ vt+1 + α]
   
yt
ϕ(yt|y0)ˆ at(θ0,yt)dΘ0 +
   
yt
ϕ(yt|y0)ˆ σt(θ0,yt)dΘ0
= 0 + 1,
where the last line follows from the fact that the bond and stock market clears in the Bewley
equilibrium. Thus, we conclude that the allocations and prices proposed in the theorem indeed are
an equilibrium in the de-trended Bond model, and, after appropriate scaling, in the original Bond
model.
• Proof of Lemma 5.1:






Subtracting the two Euler equations (50)-(51) in the Arrow model and (55)-(56) in the Bond model





























Thus the representative agent stochastic discount factor βλ(zt+1)−γ prices the excess return of
stocks over bonds in both the Arrow and the Bond model. Note that in the Arrow model (but
not in the Bond model) this stochastic discount factor any excess return Ri
t+1 − Rt as long as the
returns only depend on the aggregate state zt+1.
• Proof of Proposition 5.1:






























= κt ≥ 1 (58)
where
ˆ RRE













is the risk-free interest rate in the de-trended representative agent model. Note that the multi-
plicative factor κt may depend on time since ˆ RA
t may, but is nonstochastic, since ˆ RA
t = ˆ Rt (the
risk-free interest rate in the de-trended Arrow model equals that in the Bewley model, which is
evidently nonstochastic). Since interest rates in the Bewley model are (weakly) smaller than in the
representative agent model, κt ≥ 1. Equation (58) implies that the stochastic discount factor in the




Finally, since the stochastic discount factor for the Arrow model is also a valid stochastic discount
factor in the Bond model (although not necessarily the unique valid stochastic discount factor), the
previous result also applies to the Bond model.
• Proof of Theorem 5.1:
Remember that we deﬁned the multiplicative risk premium in the main text as
1 + νt =
EtRt,1 [{et+k}]
Rt,1 [1]
We use mt,t+k = mt+1·mt+2 ...·mt+k to denote the k-period ahead pricing kernel (with convention
that mt,t = 1), such that Et(dt+kmt,t+k) denotes the price at time t of a random payoﬀ dt+k. Note
that whenever there is no room for confusion we suppress the dependence of variables on zt.
First, note that the multiplicative risk premium on a claim to aggregate consumption can be stated
as a weighted sum of risk premia on strips (as shown by Alvarez and Jermann (2001)). By deﬁnition
of Rt,1 [{et+k}] we have
Rt,1 [{et+k}] =
 ∞







































and it is suﬃcient to show that the multiplicative risk premium EtRt,1 [et+k]/Rt,1 [1] on all k-period
strips of aggregate consumption (a claim to the Lucas tree’s dividend in period k only, not the entire
stream) is the same in the Arrow model as in the representative agent model. First, we show that
























The ﬁrst equality follows from dividing through by et. The second equality follows from the expres-
sion for mA in Proposition 5.1: mA
t+1 = mRE
t+1κt.






























and thus risk premia on all k-period consumption strips in the Arrow model coincide with those in
the representative agent model. But then (62) implies that the multiplicative risk premium in the
two models coincide as well.




































ously coincide with the bond Euler equation in the Bewley model, and thus the Bewley equilibrium
allocation satisﬁes the Euler equations for Arrow securities. A similar argument applies to the Euler
60equation for stocks:





ˆ vt+1(zt+1) + α
ˆ vt(zt)




















ˆ Rt  βt+1
which can easily be veriﬁed from equation (35).
• Proof of Proposition 6.1:
We need to check that Arrow securities positions deﬁned in (38) satisfy the market clearing condition
   
yt−1
ϕ(yt−1|y0)ˆ at−1(θ0,yt−1,zt)dΘ0 = 0 for all zt.
for each zt. By the goods market clearing condition in the Bewley model we have, since total labor
income makes up a fraction 1 − α of total income
































ϕ(yτ|yt)[ˆ cτ(θ0,yτ) − (1 − α)η(yτ)]dΘ0 = α for all τ > t
Since the stock market clears in the Bewley model we have
   
yt−1
ϕ(yt−1|y0)ˆ σt−1(θ0,yt−1)dΘ0 = 1.
Since the stock is a claim to α times the aggregate endowment in all future periods its (ex-dividend)
price has to satisfy






61Combining these results implies that
   
yt
ϕ(yt|y0)ˆ at−1(θ0,yt−1,zt)dΘ0















for each zt. Thus, each of the Arrow securities markets clears if households hold portfolios given by
(38).
• Proof of Lemma 6.2:
By (34)




















ˆ φ(zt−1|z0)ˆ β0,t−1(zt−1|z0) = ˜ Qt.
by deﬁnition of   βt in equation (32) and the fact that
 
zt|zt−1 ˆ φ(zt|zt−1) = 1.
• Proof of Lemma 6.3:
The Arrow securities position at time zero needed to ﬁnance all future excess consumption mandated
by the Bewley equilibrium is given by





ˆ Qτ(zτ|z0)(ˆ cτ(θ0,yτ) − (1 − α)η(yτ))
−ˆ σ0(θ0,y0)[ˆ v0(z0) + α],
where we substituted indexes −1 by 0 to denote initial conditions. In particular, ˆ σ0(θ0,y0) is the
62initial share position of an individual with wealth θ0. But
ˆ a−1(θ0,y0,z0).





ˆ Qτ(zτ|z0)ϕ(yτ|y0)(ˆ cτ(θ0,yτ) − (1 − α)η(yτ))
− ˆ σ0(θ0,y0)[ˆ v0(z0) + α].

































where the last equality comes from the intertemporal budget constraint in the standard incom-
plete markets Bewley model and the fact that the initial share position in that model is given by
ˆ σ0(θ0,y0).
• Proof of Proposition 6.2:
The stationary Bewley allocation {ˆ aB




+ ˆ σt(yt)ˆ vt ≥ ˆ Kt(yt). (63)
Using the fact that ˆ aB
t (yt) = 0 and adding
 
zt+1
ˆ qt(zt+1|zt)ˆ at(yt,zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)ˆ vt(zt)
to both sides of (63) yields
 
zt+1
ˆ qt(zt+1|zt)ˆ at(yt,zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)ˆ vt(zt)
≥ ˆ Kt(yt) +
 
zt+1




t (yt) is the modiﬁed constraint for the de-trended Arrow model. Multiplying both sides by
et(zt) gives the modiﬁed constraint for the Arrow model with growth stated in the main text. For
the alternative constraint, we know that the Bewley equilibrium allocation satisﬁes
ˆ aB
t (yt) + ˆ σt(yt)[ˆ vt+1 + α] ≥ ˆ Mt(yt). (64)
63Again using ˆ aB
t (yt) = 0 and adding
ˆ at(yt,zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)[ˆ vt+1(zt+1) + α]
to both sides of (63) yields
ˆ at(yt,zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)[ˆ vt+1(zt+1) + α]
≥ ˆ Mt(yt) + ˆ at(yt,zt+1) + ˆ σt(yt)[ˆ vt+1(zt+1) − ˆ vt+1]
≡ ˆ M∗
t (yt,zt+1)
Multiplying both sides by et+1(zt+1) again gives rise to the constraint stated in the main text.
64